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Relief for Student Loan Borrowers 
Victimized by “Relief” Companies 
Masquerading as Legitimate Help 
Creola Johnson* 
Masquerading as legitimate help are companies that target forty-four million borrowers 
owing over $1.6 trillion in student loan debt. “Relief” companies purport to help borrowers 
struggling to repay student loans but, in fact, inflict irreversible financial harm by charging 
borrowers unlawful fees. Often pretending to be affiliated with the U.S. Department of 
Education (Education Department), relief companies falsely claim they can enroll borrowers 
into income-driven repayment plans and forgiveness programs. Exploiting twenty-first century 
technologies, relief companies can now easily reach millions of borrowers by, for example, 
making robocalls to cellphones, posting phony five-star reviews on social media, and requiring 
borrowers to e-sign documents disclosing their financial information. One company alone 
bilked student loan borrowers out of thirty-five million dollars in unlawful fees for bogus relief. 
This Article addresses the federal response to widespread fraud by relief companies. 
Borrowers can theoretically obtain free help from private companies called “loan servicers,” 
which are authorized by the Education Department to assist borrowers with repayment 
options. However, under new leadership since 2017, the Education Department has taken 
steps to shield loan servicers from being held accountable for alleged unlawful servicing 
practices. Similarly, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) has implemented 
several harmful changes, including closing the only federal office dedicated to assisting student 
loan borrowers. In light of harmful actions taken by the CFPB and the Education 
Department, this Article proposes that states establish ombudsmen to effectively advocate for 
borrowers and eliminate their susceptibility to relief companies falsely promising to help. This 
Article also proposes that Congress require the Education Department to implement existing 
technology-based solutions to prevent relief companies from taking over borrowers’ online loan 
accounts to conceal their fraudulent activities. 
  
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INTRODUCTION 
During a commencement address, nearly four hundred graduates erupted into 
cheers after billionaire Robert Smith announced his establishment of a thirty-four 
million dollar fund to pay off the student loan debt of the entire Morehouse College 
Class of 2019.1 This widely reported announcement sparked hope.2 Unfortunately, 
however, there remain over forty-four million borrowers, owing over $1.6 trillion 
in student loans, who cannot expect a billionaire bailout.3 With so many borrowers 
burdened with student loan debt, companies claiming to alleviate their financial 
distress can target millions of borrowers.4 
Consider the experience of Chelsea Olds after she received a text message 
stating that she was qualified for student loan forgiveness.5 Ms. Olds, a therapy 
assistant owing nearly $30,000 in student loan debt, thought the text message was 
from the federal government.6 Following a brief communication by phone,  
Ms. Olds received an email message from an employee at AmeriTech Financial,  
Inc. (AmeriTech), informing her that her student loan payments would be reduced 
and, after twenty-five years of payments, any remaining debt would be forgiven.7 
After clicking on a link provided in the email message, Ms. Olds watched a 
video of a speech by President Barack Obama about forgiveness of federal student 
 
1. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Robert F. Smith’s Morehouse Pledge Is Getting a Lot Bigger,  
WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2019, 10:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/robert-
f-smiths-morehouse-pledge-is-getting-a-lot-bigger/2019/09/20/1ab08e6e-ce6f-11e9-b29b-a528dc82 
154a_story.html [https://perma.cc/XDM6-NPLR]; Bo Emerson, Morehouse Commencement Speaker to 
Pay Off Class of 2019’s Student Loans, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 20, 2019, at A1; Dalvin Brown, ‘I’m 
So Salty’: Twitter Reacts to Robert. F. Smith’s Vow to Cover Morehouse Grads’ Debt, DAILY AM., May 
20, 2019 (reporting that 396 graduates would have their student loan debts paid off by Mr. Smith). 
2. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1.  
3. Examining Legislation to Protect Consumers and Small Business Owners from Abusive Debt 
Collection Practices: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rohit 
Chopra, Comm’r, Federal Trade Commission); see also Consumer Credit - G.19, BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/ [http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20200531160119/https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/ ] 
(May 7, 2020) (May 2020 figures). Most outstanding student loan debt is guaranteed by the federal 
government. See Christopher K. Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1627, 
1631 (2019). 
4. See, e.g., Susan Tompor, Don’t Believe the Pitch for Student Loan Forgiveness, USA TODAY, 
July 16, 2019, at B6. 
5. See Declaration of Chelsea Olds in Support of FTC Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, 
FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr., No. 4:18-cv-00806-SBA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Chelsea 
Olds’s Declaration ]. 
6. Id. 
7. Id.  
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loan debt.8 Further persuaded by this video, Ms. Olds was confident in her decision 
to sign up for AmeriTech’s program by electronically signing several documents, 
which, among other things, disclosed her sensitive financial information.9 
Thereafter, AmeriTech withdrew from Ms. Olds’s bank account $255 for the first 
month, $235 each month for the next six months, and then $99 each month for the 
following six months.10  
Then in July 2017, Ms. Olds received a past-due notice from Nelnet, Inc., the 
loan servicing company authorized by the U.S. Department of Education 
(Education Department) to collect her student loan payments.11 She contacted 
Nelnet and explained that her payments were current because she had made them 
through AmeriTech.12 The employee then gave Ms. Olds the “shock” of her  
life—not a single payment to AmeriTech had gone to Nelnet.13 After contacting 
AmeriTech and being unsuccessful in getting a refund, Ms. Olds had to face 
reality.14 She had been duped. Not only was she out of roughly $1,800, but her 
student loan balance had also increased due to the capitalization of interest, and her 
stress level was exacerbated.15 Ms. Olds is one of over 40,000 borrowers across the 
nation duped into paying sixty million dollars to AmeriTech for phony  
relief programs.16  
Ms. Olds’s experience raises two pressing questions: (1) Are there legitimate 
federal programs that reduce loan payments and forgive student loan debt, and (2) 
do companies like AmeriTech have the authority to enroll borrowers in those 
programs? The answer to the first question is that the Education Department has 
numerous federal programs under which qualified borrowers can obtain reduced 
monthly payments and forgiveness of student loan debts.17 The answer to the 
 
8.  Id.  
9.  Id.  
10. Id. (stating that her first payment was $255).  
11. Id. at 1–2. 
12. Id. at 2. 
13. Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id.  
16. See Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr.,  
No. 4:18-cv-00806-SBA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2018) [hereinafter American Financial Inj. Order ]; Updated 
Joint Case Management & Proposed Order at 6, 8, FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr.,  
No. 4:18-cv-00806-SBA (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018). Brandon Frere, the owner of AmeriTech, was 
arrested in 2018 as he attempted to board a flight headed to Mexico, then pled guilty to charges of wire 
fraud and money laundering in December 2019. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., Dep’t of Just., Sonoma 
County CEO Pleads Guilty to Charges Stemming from $25-65 Million Student Loan Repayment 
Services Scam (Dec. 20, 2019), [hereinafter DOJ Press Release ], https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/
pr/sonoma-county-ceo-pleads-guilty-charges-stemming-25-65-million-student-loan-repayment 
[https://perma.cc/H6P7-LFJV].  
17. Mr. Foss, while in his capacity as Program Specialist in the Office of Federal Student Aid 
within the Education Department, described several federal loans and numerous federal repayment 
plans and forgiveness programs. See Declaration of Ian Foss in Support of FTC’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 4, FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr., No. 4:18-cv-00806-SBA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 
2018) [hereinafter Ian Foss’s Declaration ]. 
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second question is that companies purporting to provide debt relief (relief 
companies) have absolutely no authority to certify that borrowers are qualified for 
such programs and no authority to actually enroll borrowers in them.18  
This Article asserts that relief companies, using the existence of legitimate 
programs available to student loan borrowers, combine old-fashioned fraudulent 
misrepresentations with twenty-first century technology to deceive borrowers with 
false promises of debt relief. Loan servicers, including the company servicing  
Ms. Olds’s loan, are actually the legitimate companies that can help borrowers 
manage student loan debt.19 Besides processing monthly payments and handling 
billing-related matters, loan servicers are supposed to assist borrowers by helping 
them to select and enroll in legitimate federal repayment plans.20 However, over the 
years, numerous reports have credibly accused loan servicers of committing 
widespread unlawful practices, including steering borrowers’ loans into 
forbearances.21 In 2018 and 2019, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
(CFPB)22 and several state attorneys general filed separate enforcement actions 
against several loan servicers for committing unlawful deceptive and abusive 
practices.23 It is, therefore, unsurprising that many borrowers are struggling to make 
 
18. Id. at 15 (stating that only companies hired through a competitive process by the Education 
Department have the authority to service and collect payments on federal loans).  
19. See Who’s My Student Loan Servicer?, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-
loans/repayment/servicers [https://perma.cc/9LE4-QDF3] ( last visited Sept. 28, 2020 ); supra note 
18 and accompanying text. The Education Department’s Office of Federal Student Aid has regulatory 
oversight over federal student loan servicers. See ARNE DUNCAN, JAMES W. RUNCIE & JAY HURT, 
FED. STUDENT AID, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 3 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/
annual/2012report/fsa-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DY5-JYVR]. Currently, ten private companies 
have contracts with the Education Department authorizing them to service federal student loans. See 
Who’s My Student Loan Servicer?, supra (identifying the loan servicers and providing links to the 
homepage for each servicer). 
20. See Who’s My Student Loan Servicer?, supra note 19. 
21. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A05Q0008, FEDERAL 
STUDENT AID: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF SERVICER 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICING FEDERALLY HELD STUDENT LOANS 13 
(2019), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2019/a05q0008.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4PNT-67AM]; see, e.g., Ken Sweet, Report: Oversight of Student Loans Lax,  
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx? 
guid=78a58482-8f6a-4d9a-9fa8-59d72603621b [https://perma.cc/VJ9T-5WLE]; Jeff Blumenthal, 
Bank Notes: Navient Tops Consumer Complaint List Among Student Loan Servicers, PHILA. BUS. J. ( Jan. 15, 
2019, 9:36 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2019/01/14/navient-student-
loan-complaints-navi-lendedu.html [https://perma.cc/GVE9-LVXV]. 
22. The CFPB is an independent federal agency that was created as part of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) to ensure “that markets for consumer 
financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.” 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511(a),  5491(a). 
One of the primary functions of the CFPB is to collect, investigate, and respond to consumer 
complaints. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(2). The CFPB was created in the wake of the financial crisis because 
no single federal agency was primarily focused on consumer protection. See Kelly T. Cochran, The 
CFPB at Five Years: Beyond the Numbers, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 55, 55–56 (2017) (describing why 
the CFPB was formed and explaining its major functions). 
23. After completing investigations initiated during President Barack Obama’s administration, 
the CFPB and several states sued Navient Corp., the nation’s largest student loan servicer for alleged 
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payments and are in need of help but are unsure where to find it.24 As a result, loan 
servicers are partially at fault for borrowers falling prey to debt relief scams.25  
While numerous articles have tackled the student loan crisis by focusing on 
various issues, including the soaring cost of higher education,26 this Article exposes 
how more than 100 student loan debt relief companies exploit the void left by loan 
servicers to target millions of borrowers, especially those earning income at or near 
the poverty level.27 Because relief companies have no contractual relationship with 
the Education Department, they do not actually have the authority to enroll 
borrowers with student loan debts into various federally created repayment plans 
and forgiveness programs.28 Moreover, because relief companies usually charge 
upfront fees for their so-called services, these companies invariably violate relevant 
 
deceptive practices. See e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 9, Consumer  
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101, 2017 WL 191446 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) 
[hereinafter Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint ]; Complaint at 28, Illinois v. Navient 
Corp., No. 2017CH00761, 2017 WL 374522 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Illinois v. Navient 
Complaint ]. For further discussion regarding the enforcement actions filed against Navient and others, 
see infra notes 202–42 and accompanying text. 
24. See, e.g., An Examination of State Efforts to Oversee the $1.5 Trillion Student Loan Servicing 
Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,  
116th Cong. app. 78 (2019) (statement of Arwen Thoman, Director, Student Loan Assistance Unit, 
Massachusetts Att’y Gen.’s Off.) (stating that borrowers often contact the Massachusetts’s Office of 
the Attorney General and express their confusion regarding student loan balances remaining high 
despite years of making payments to the loan servicers). 
25. See id. at 11 (“[P]redatory debt relief companies take advantage of distressed borrowers who 
turn to them when student loan servicers have failed to help.”). 
26. See, e.g., Cody M. Allen, Paying the Debt: The Government’s Obligation to our Servicemembers 
and Its Duty to Simplify the Various Benefits Provided to Servicemembers with Student Loans, 26  
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179 (2018); Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and the Siren Song of Systemic 
Risk, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99, 104-05 (2016) (“[T]he commentaries express concern that rising 
student indebtedness is precarious and unsustainable . . . .”); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The 
Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229 (2009). 
27. See Richard Read & Teddy Nykiel, Feds Point Fingers as ‘Debt Relief’ Companies Prey on 
Students, NERDWALLET ( June 14, 2017), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/student-loans/
debt-relief-companies-prey-student-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/VRF8-2BNG] (maintaining a 
watch list of companies suspected of perpetrating student loan relief scams by regularly searching court 
records for lawsuits and negative ratings by the Better Business Bureau); FTC v. All. Document 
Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (alleging that defendants “are targeting 
vulnerable, low-income debtors and are convincing them to pay rates up to 5% of their yearly income 
for a service freely offered by student loan provider [i.e., servicer]”). 
28. See, e.g., Off. of the Att’y Gen. v. Strategic Student Sols. LLC, No. 50-2017-CA-005788, 
2018 WL 6652962, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 26, 2018) (entering judgment against defendants for violating 
Florida law because, among other things, defendant “had no special business relationship” with the 
Education Department); District of Columbia v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., No. 2016 CA 003768 B, 2017 
WL 9532847, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2017) (imposing nearly $418,000 in monetary damages 
on defendants who falsely represented they could secure lower payments and debt forgiveness  
for borrowers). 
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state and federal laws that forbid the charging of such fees.29 As a result, relief 
companies are not considered legitimate debt relief companies in this Article.30  
As explained in Part I of this Article, relief companies step into the thicket of 
borrower confusion and promise relief to borrowers by committing old-school 
fraudulent practices (e.g., oral misrepresentations) to mislead consumers into 
signing up for phony relief.31 By engaging in a high-level mimicry strategy, relief 
companies pretend to be legitimate governmental or nonprofit organizations,32 
misrepresent their ability to secure for borrowers lower payments and loan 
forgiveness, and misrepresent their ability to reverse the consequences of 
borrowers’ defaulting.33 
Relief companies combine fraudulent misrepresentations with twenty-first 
century technologies to target millions of borrowers.34 While modern technology 
may be employed to defraud consumers in a myriad of situations,35 relief companies 
act as digital predators by successfully weaponizing technology to defraud 
thousands of student loan borrowers.36 As demonstrated in Part II of this Article, 
relief companies no longer have to target consumers by simply relying on 
communications via “snail mail” and landline telephones.37 Relief companies 
weaponize modern technology by making millions of robocalls with prerecorded 
 
29. See Strategic Student Sols., 2018 WL 6652962, at *2 (finding defendants violated Florida law 
when they charged fees ranging from $166 to $233 as part of a “strategic” misrepresentation that 
consumers’ loan payments would then decrease); All. Document Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1210 
(holding that defendants, which purportedly offered student loan relief services, violated Telemarketing 
Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i) (2018), by charging upfront, one-time fee of $499 before doing 
any services). Companies that charge upfront fees should signal a red flag that a scam is afoot. That is 
because loan servicers cannot charge borrowers with federal student loans fees to get assistance with 
enrolling in repayment plans or certifying borrowers for loan forgiveness programs. See Ian Foss’s 
Declaration, supra note 17, at 15. 
30. See infra notes 202–242 and accompanying text (describing common fraudulent 
misrepresentations made by relief companies). 
31. See infra notes 202–242 and accompanying text. 
32. See, e.g., All. Document Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1205 (issuing an injunction where, 
among other things, “[d]efendants intentionally misled consumers, whether through direct statements 
or through implication, to believe that [d]efendants were associated with the Department of Education, 
the Federal Government, or with consumer’s existing student loan servicers”). 
33. See id.; infra notes 202–242 and accompanying text.  
34. See infra Sections II.A–G. 
35. In the “Grandparent Scam,” scammers use technology to, for example, send a text message 
that is purportedly from a grandchild to a grandpa or grandma and ask that money be wired to him or 
her in order to post bail to be released from jail. See Family Emergency Scams, FTC, https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0204-family-emergency-scams [https://perma.cc/R7WB-55DF] ( last 
visited Sept. 28, 2020). 
36. See infra Sections II.A–G. 
37. See, e.g., Tompor, supra note 4 (reporting that relief companies target consumers with 
robocalls); Review of the FY2020 Budget Request for the FCC & FTC: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter FTC 
Hearing ] (statement of Joseph Simons, Chairman, FTC) (testifying that advances in technology permit 
“bad actors to place millions or even billions of calls, often from abroad, at very low costs, and in ways 
that are difficult to trace”). 
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advertisements and sending millions of messages via text and email.38 Relief 
companies also effectively use technology by advertising through optimized online 
search results, promoting phony relief on social media platforms, and creating 
websites with fake sponsorship.39 Finally, relief companies effectively use modern 
technology to require borrowers to electronically sign documents disclosing 
sensitive personal and financial information.40 These companies mislead borrowers 
into believing such information will be used to work with their servicers to get the 
best results for borrowers.41 However, like Ms. Olds above,42 borrowers discover 
too late that the information is actually used to continue to charge their debit or 
credit cards and hide the fact that no debt reduction or forgiveness is being obtained 
on behalf of borrowers.43  
Part III posits that comprehensive federal and state legislation are necessary 
to curb student loan relief scams even though borrowers with certain loans have 
not had to make payments since spring 2020. During the recently declared  
COVID-19 pandemic, the United States Congress passed legislation that affords 
temporary relief to borrowers only if they have federal student loans owned by the 
Education Department, and it suspends their loan payments, stops the accrual of 
interest, and bans certain collection practices against them.44 Part III contends that 
 
38. Consider again Ms. Olds, who erroneously concluded that text message about loan 
forgiveness was from the government. See Chelsea Olds’s Declaration, supra note 5. The enforcement 
action against AmeriTech revealed several instances where the company led borrowers to believe that 
it was the Education Department. See American Financial Inj. Order, supra note 16, at 15–16 (alleging 
that defendants also claimed to work with the Education Department); Declaration of Chelsea 
Carbonneau in Support of FTC Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr., 
No. 4:18-cv-00806-SBA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018) (stating that a company employee told her that they 
were affiliated with the Education Department). For further discussion of scam-related text messages, 
see infra notes 130–161 and accompanying text. See also Legislation to Stop the Onslaught of Annoying 
Robocalls: Hearing on H.R. 3375 Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy 
and Com., 116th Cong. 10 (2019) (statement of Margot Saunders, Senior Counsel, National Consumer 
Law Center) (urging Congress to put further restrictions on telemarketing because “robodialing and 
robotexting technology” allows companies to annually target consumers with billions of calls and  
text messages). 
39. See infra notes 135–177 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra notes 178–195 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra notes 178–195 and accompanying text. 
42. See Chelsea Olds’s Declaration, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
43. Id.; see also infra notes 178–189 and accompanying text. 
44. See The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No.  
116-136, § 3513, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). This act is commonly known as the CARES Act and was enacted 
on March 27, 2020. The CARES Act does not provide any student loan relief to roughly seven million 
borrowers with private loans, which are owed to banks and other creditors, and with Perkins loans, 
which are owed to individual colleges and universities. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Education 
Department Clarifies Trump Executive Order on Student Loans, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2020, 2:09 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/08/21/education-department-clarifies-trump-
executive-order-student-loans/ [https://perma.cc/6ABG-WZTL] (describing the details of the 
Education Department’s extension of temporary relief through 2020, thereby allowing qualified 
borrowers to skip loan payments until 2021). The pause on payments was set to expire September 30, 
2020; however, President Trump signed a memorandum that extends it until December 31, 2020. See 
Meghan Lustig, Update on Coronavirus Relief for Student Loan Borrowers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD  
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comprehensive legislation is needed to deter scams because so-called relief 
companies continue to scam student loan borrowers during the pandemic, loan 
servicers continue to fall short of their contractual obligations to help borrowers 
obtain affordable monthly payments, and the Education Department refuses to 
hold the servicers accountable for their failures and has taken several actions 
deemed harmful to borrowers.45 Legislative action is also necessary because the 
CFPB, under new leadership, has implemented several harmful changes, including 
shuttering the Office for Students and Young Consumers (OSYC), the only federal 
office dedicated to affording protection to student loan borrowers.46  
 
REP. (Sept. 2, 2020, 10:47 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/
articles/update-on-coronavirus-relief-for-student-loan-borrowers [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20200902232932/https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/articles/update-
on-coronavirus-relief-for-student-loan-borrowers ]. Even though the CARES Act has suspended 
collections against borrowers with federal student loans owned by the Education Department, a 
pending class-action lawsuit accuses Secretary Betsy DeVos and the Education Department of 
repeatedly violating the new law by, among other things, unlawfully garnishing borrowers’ wages and 
intercepting their tax refunds. See Complaint, Barber v. DeVos, No. 1:20-cv-1137-CJN, 2020 WL 
2094077 (D.D.C. April 30, 2020). 
45. For a recently filed complaint alleging unlawful practices perpetrated by a student loan debt 
relief operation, see Complaint, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. GST Factoring, Inc.,  
No. 8:20-cv-01239 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/ 
cfpb_gst-factoring-et-al_complaint_2020-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/RFB5-R98L]. For an understanding 
of recent litigation charging the largest student loan servicer with unlawful practices, see Pennsylvania 
v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d 529, 537 (M.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, 967 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2020) (denying 
a motion to dismiss filed by Navient Corporation, the loan servicer formerly known as Sallie Mae, and 
concluding that Pennsylvania had sufficiently alleged that Navient committed unlawful practices, 
including steering borrowers into forbearance, which resulted in larger debt balances due to the accrual 
of interest). For further discussion of pending enforcement actions filed against loan servicers, see infra 
notes 202–241 and accompanying text. In fact, the Education Department and its Secretary, Betsy 
DeVos, were fined $100,000 under a civil contempt court order for their failure to stop unlawfully 
collecting on loans owed by former students who were defrauded by the for-profit Corinthian Colleges 
(now defunct). See Calvillo Manriquez v. DeVos, 411 F. Supp. 3d 535, 538–39 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding 
the Education Department and Secretary DeVos in civil contempt for violating a preliminary injunction 
order when they “notified at least 3,000 Corinthian borrowers that their loans were entering 
repayment,” “provided adverse reports to credit reporting agencies for 847 Corinthian borrowers[,] and 
collected on the loans of 1,808 Corinthian borrowers through wage garnishment or offsets from tax 
refunds.”). For further discussion of actions taken by Secretary Betsy DeVos to reverse Obama-era 
protections, see infra notes 245–289 and accompanying text. 
46. Jill E. Habig & Joanna Pearl, Cities as Engines of Justice, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159,  
1175–76 (2018) (describing actions constituting dramatic retrenchment from consumer protection by 
the CFPB under the leadership of Mick Mulvaney, who was appointed by President Donald Trump as 
the CFPB’s interim director); Glenn Thrush and Stacy Cowley, Mulvaney Demotes Student Loan Unit in 
Consumer Bureau Reshuffle, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2018, at B4 (reporting that Mick Mulvaney announced 
his decision to shutter the OSYC at the bottom of a memo sent to the CFPB staff and stated that the 
OSYC would “be folded into the office of ‘Financial Education’”). Seth Frotman, who was then the 
CFPB’s ombudsman and the head of the OSYC, resigned in protest after the OSYC was closed. See 
Yuka Hayashi, U.S. News: CFPB Official Resigns, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2018, at A4; Turns His Back 
on Student Borrowers, Closes Office of Students and Young Consumers, CONSUMER ACTION (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.consumer-action.org/press/articles/mick_mulvaney_turns_his_back_on_student_ 
borrowers1 [https://perma.cc/9TS9-YKB2]; infra notes 334–367 and accompanying text (describing 
Mr. Mulvaney’s actions that are harmful to consumers in general and student loan borrowers  
in particular). 
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To deter student loan relief scams, this Article proposes, in Part IV,47 that each 
state creates an office similar to the former OSYC, headed by an advocate or 
ombudsman to assist borrowers.48 The state-created ombudsman should have 
expansive duties that include receiving complaints about relief companies, assisting 
borrowers in obtaining legitimate debt management help, and reporting relief 
companies to authorities charged with enforcing consumer laws.49 Admittedly, on 
the federal level, no bipartisan consensus exists for regulating student loan servicers 
and requiring them to actually assist borrowers struggling with student loan debt.50  
Instead of waiting for a consensus on how to regulate loan servicers, Part IV 
argues that Congress should pass bipartisan proposed laws that are aimed at curbing 
the practices of debt relief companies. For example, student loan borrowers, like 
Ms. Olds, would benefit from recently enacted legislation directing the Federal 
Communications Commission to issue rules requiring telecommunication providers 
to use the latest technologies to block robocalls. 51 Moreover, Congress should pass 
legislation that would make it a felony for an unauthorized person to obtain 
borrowers’ information to access their online student loan accounts.52 Congress 
should also require the Education Department and loan servicers to implement 
multifactor authentication technology systems to prevent relief companies from 
taking over borrowers’ online accounts to further their deception.53 Under such 
requirements, individuals operating companies like AmeriTech would not be able 
to take over borrowers’ student loan accounts to conceal their fraudulent charges 
for phony relief programs.54  
I. RELIEF COMPANIES MAKE TYPICAL FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS TO 
ENTICE CONSUMER BORROWERS  
Relief companies are forced out of the shadows and on to the center stage of 
the student loan crisis, where they attempt to take advantage of millions of student 
loan borrowers. The federal government backs the vast majority of the $1.6 trillion 
in student loan debt, and, unlike borrowers with private loans, borrowers with 
 
47. See infra notes 431–482 and accompanying text.  
48. See infra notes 310–313 and accompanying text (discussing the OSYC’s activities prior to 
being shuttered). 
49. See infra notes 464–475 and accompanying text.  
50. See, e.g., Nick Simpson, CBA Writes House Financial Services Committee on Student Lending, 
CONSUMER BANKERS ASS’N (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.consumerbankers.com/cba-media-center/
media-releases/cba-writes-house-financial-services-committee-student-lending [https://perma.cc/ 
6EWW-Y89Q] (discussing the Consumer Bankers Association’s letter to Congress on student loan 
reforms ahead of a House Financial Services Committee hearing on the matter). 
51. See infra notes 352–365 and accompanying text (discussing a new law that requires 
telecommunication companies to use technologies to detect and deter robocalls). 
52. See infra notes 371–389 and accompanying text. 
53. See infra notes 408–427 and accompanying text (discussing author’s proposed system that 
detects suspicious activities and prevents anyone from making changes to a borrower’s online student 
loan account until the borrower makes direct contact with the loan servicer). 
54. See infra notes 408–427 and accompanying text.  
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federal student loans can take advantage of various affordable payment plans and 
forgiveness programs.55 But, similar to parasitic fish mimicking different types of 
benign “cleaner” fish, relief companies mimic different types of legitimate entities 
to defraud millions of borrowers struggling to pay back their federal student loans.56 
Such behavior by relief companies includes the following: misrepresenting 
themselves as legitimate governmental organizations, claiming falsely the ability to 
secure affordable payments for borrowers, misleading borrowers into believing they 
are qualified to obtain loan forgiveness, claiming falsely that borrowers must sign 
up immediately to obtain relief, and, finally, misrepresenting their ability to reverse 
the consequences of borrowers’ defaulting.57 In 2017, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC)58 launched a coordinated federal-state law enforcement 
partnership, called Operation Game of Loans, and it has resulted in the filing of 
over thirty-six federal and state enforcement actions and the shutting down of more 
than two dozen relief companies.59 These enforcement actions will be used to 
describe below the common misrepresentations made by relief companies.60 Later, 
in Part II, this Article describes how relief companies weaponize modern 
technology to target millions of borrowers with their misrepresentations.61  
 
55. More than ninety percent of all student loan debt is issued or guaranteed by the federal 
government. See Kevin Wack, Students Leaving Money on Table in Not Using Government Loan: Report, 
AM. BANKER (Sept. 19, 2018, 11:33 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/students-leaving-
money-on-table-in-not-using-government-loans-report [https://perma.cc/ZU4D-MJ7U]; Odinet, 
supra note 3, at 1630–31(stating that the standard repayment plan requires a borrower to make equal 
monthly payments for ten years and summarizing various income-based payment plans that permit 
much lower payments and allow up 30 years of payments). 
56. See, e.g., Ed Yong, Fake Cleaner Fish Dons Multiple Disguises, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC  
(Oct. 24, 2009), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2009/10/24/fake-
cleaner-fish-dons-multiple-disguises/ [https://perma.cc/9CBN-3DRC] (describing how the 
fangblenny fish has multiple disguises that mimic “the helpful wrasse [cleaner fish],” and then “get[s] 
close enough to mount quick attacks on larger fish, biting off scales and skin”); Sarah Jane Alger, Hiding 
in Plain Sight, SCITABLE BY NATURE EDUCATION: ACCUMULATING GLITCHES (Sept. 16, 2013), 
https://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/accumulating-glitches/hiding_in_plain_sight [https:// 
perma.cc/9DX6-SHLT] (stating that the “bluestriped fangblenny doesn’t simply look like another 
species, but it can change its look to resemble any of three different species,” in order to position itself 
to bite another fish). For further discussion of tactics employed by relief companies to appear 
legitimate, see infra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
57. See infra notes 62–108 and accompanying text.  
58. The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) gives the FTC enforcement authority over 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).  
59. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, State Law Enforcement Partners Announce 
Nationwide Crackdown on Student Loan Debt Relief Scams (Oct. 13, 2017) [hereinafter FTC’s 
Operation Game of Loans ], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/10/ftc-state-law-
enforcement-partners-announce-nationwide-crackdown [https://perma.cc/S5JG-6KAJ] (stating that 
the Operation Game of Loans is a federal and state partnership that includes 11 states along with the 
District of Columbia and summarizing several enforcement actions). 
60. Id. 
61. See infra Sections II.A–G. 
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A. Disguise Themselves as Legitimate Governmental and Nonprofit Organizations 
Relief companies mislead borrowers by purporting to be legitimate 
governmental and nonprofit organizations. For example, relief companies 
frequently claim to actually be the Education Department62 or to be directly or 
indirectly affiliated with it.63 To further their appearance of legitimacy, relief 
companies also use names that are similar to governmental agencies, such as “First 
Student Aid,”64 or claim to be legitimate nonprofit organizations that help 
borrowers.65 Relief companies frequently use domain names for their websites with 
an ending suffix, such as “.us” or “.org” to appear to be a governmental or 
nonprofit entity.66 They also prominently feature logos consisting of laurel leaves 
and a shield, thereby resembling logos used by several federal agencies.67  
To convince young borrowers that they are legitimate, many relief companies 
make specific references to former President Barack Obama, thereby tapping into 
his popularity among young adults.68 In 2011, President Obama announced the 
“Pay As You Earn” initiative to help borrowers obtain affordable loan payments.69 
 
62. See Beware: You Never Have to Pay for Help with Student Loans, FED. STUDENT AID,  
https://studentaid.gov/resources/scams#beware-of-student-loan-debt-relief-companies [https:// 
perma.cc/E97S-2NDD] ( last visited Sept. 29, 2020) (providing borrowers with warning signs that a 
company is operating a student loan relief scam). 
63. See, e.g., Complaint at 10, Illinois v. Nat’l Student Loan Rescue, Inc., No. 2016-CH-03196, 
2016 WL 1028957 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 2016) (alleging that a relief company claimed to “work[ ] 
specifically” with FedLoan Servicing, an actual loan servicer authorized by the Education Department); 
District of Columbia v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., No. 2016 CA 003768 B, 2017 WL 9532847, at *1  
(D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2017); FTC v. All. Document Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1205  
(C.D. Cal. 2017) (finding that defendants misled borrowers into believing that the defendants were 
affiliated with the borrowers’ loan servicers). 
64. See, e.g., All. Document Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1201 (explaining that loan relief 
companies used names such as First Student Aid, similar to its legitimate counterpart: Office of Federal 
Student Aid). 
65. See, e.g., Richard Read, Company Insider Struggles with Student Loan Debtors’ Misery, NEWS 
HERALD ( June 14, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.newsherald.com/business/20170614/company-
insider-struggles-with-student-loan-debtors-misery [https://perma.cc/YX6Q-5E6M] (reporting about 
the revocation of nonprofit status of a loan relief company that was shut down for operating a 
fraudulent for-profit student loan relief scam). 
66. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. IrvineWebWorks, Inc., No. SACV 14-1967 JVS, 2016 WL 
1056662, at *1, *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
67. Complaint at 5–6, Minnesota v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., No. 27-CV-15-11307S  
(D. Minn. July 1, 2015) [hereinafter Minn. v. SAC Complaint ]; see also Complaint at 9, Texas v. Student 
Loan Relief, LLC, No. D-1-GN-17-005516, 2017 WL 4390722 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2017) (alleging that 
defendants bolster their claims of expertise with misrepresentations such as “[w]e currently work with 
more than 300 different programs”). 
68. See, e.g., Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, at 5. 
69. See Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: “Help Americans 
Manage Student Loan Debt” (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/10/25/fact-sheet-help-americans-manage-student-loan-debt [https://perma.cc/V4AB-
CWT8]; Information About the New Pay-As-You-Earn Proposal, FED. STUDENT AID, 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/PayAsYouEarn.jsp  [https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20120618034733/http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/engl
ish/PayAsYouEarn.jsp ] ( last visited July 20, 2020). 
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Because this initiative was covered extensively by the media and is now a legitimate 
repayment plan for federal loans,70 some borrowers evidently thought many 
companies were legitimately part of the Education Department and authorized to 
offer an Obama-related loan repayment program.71  
B. Misrepresent Their Ability to Secure Affordable Loan Payments for Borrowers  
Once relief companies are successful in appearing to be entities authorized to 
offer legal programs, these companies falsely claim borrowers are “pre-qualified,” 
“approved,” or “eligible” for various legal repayment plans that lower borrowers’ 
payments.72 Some companies take it a step further by cleverly wording aspects of 
their repayment plan to avoid liability for deceptive practices.73  
Consider as an example American Financial Benefits Center, operating as 
AmeriTech, which advertised that it could secure for borrowers a “fixed payment” 
repayment plan.74 Under legitimate federal repayment programs, a borrower’s 
income and family size must be supplied annually to maintain enrollment in various 
repayment plans.75 Because those figures usually change often over time, a 
borrower’s payments would not remain fixed for the duration of a student’s 
repayment.76 Therefore, no company could lawfully guarantee a borrower a  
fixed-payment plan until the loan is repaid in full.77  
Although relief companies usually promise lower payments, reduced accrued 
interest, or similar loan-related results, in actuality, many relief companies do 
nothing78 or else use the borrowers’ information to either put their loans into 
 
70. See, e.g., Alison Damast, Obama’s New ‘Pay as You Earn’ Plan a Windfall for MBAs, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2012 (describing President Obama’s plan to provide student 
loan forgiveness after 20 years); see also 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2) (2018). 
71. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., No. 2016 CA 003768 B, 2017 WL 
9532847, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2017) (holding defendants liable for nearly $418,000 in 
monetary damages where, among other things, defendants misrepresented their affiliation with the 
Education Department by marketing debt relief through the “Obama Student Loan  
Forgiveness Program”). 
72. See Off. of the Att’y Gen. v. Strategic Student Sols. LLC, No. 50-2017-CA-005788, 2018 
WL 6652962, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 26, 2018) (finding defendant charged borrowers upfront fees to 
provide the same services available to borrowers through the Education Department free of charge). 
73. See, e.g., FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr., 324 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (denying 
defendants’ motion to dismiss based FTC allegations that defendants violated federal law by, among 
other things, misrepresenting their ability to secure fixed payments for borrowers). 
74. Id. at 1072 (alleging that defendants collected upfront fees ranging from $600 to $800 to 
enroll borrowers in programs with fixed payments).  
75. Id. at 1077.  
76. Id. 
77. See id. at 1077–81 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss); see, e.g., American Financial  
Inj. Order, supra note 16, at 3 (granting preliminary injunction where defendants told borrowers that 
they would get fixed lower payments). 
78. See, e.g., FTC v. Good EBusiness, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-01048-ODW-JPR, 2016 WL 3704489, 
at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2016) (holding that a monetary award equal to consumer injury is 
proportional to the seriousness of the defendants’ conduct where the defendant violated federal law by, 
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forbearance or consolidate them.79 In either situation, the borrowers do not know 
about the requested forbearances or consolidations and, therefore, do not realize 
that their loan balances will increase—thereby making borrowers worse off 
financially.80 
A few relief companies sometimes submit, on behalf of borrowers, 
applications for enrollment in income-driven repayment (IDR) plans.81 However, 
submission of IDR enrollment applications is just part of an elaborate ruse by relief 
companies to convince borrowers that they will secure lower payments for them.82 
For example, according to federal and state authorities, Consumer Advocacy 
Center, Inc. (CAC) and several related entities submitted IDR applications that 
falsified borrowers’ relevant data, including annual income, family size, and marital 
status, in order to get borrowers qualified for artificially low monthly payments.83 
Once the loan servicers approved of the IDR applications, CAC was then able to 
offer proof to borrowers that their monthly payments had been lowered.84 
However, borrowers did not benefit from their enrollment in IDR plans85 because 
CAC, thereafter, kept all the borrowers’ monthly payments.86  
C. Mislead Borrowers into Believing They Qualify for Loan Forgiveness or Debt Elimination  
Besides misleading borrowers about lowering their payments, relief companies 
falsely represent an ability to obtain loan forgiveness for borrowers or eliminate 
most of their student loan debt.87 For example, Kathryn Hamblen, a nurse 
practitioner employed at a rural clinic in Illinois, believed Student Consulting 
Group’s promise to obtain loan forgiveness for her and, thereafter, made payments 
 
among other things, charging upfront fees—ranging from $500 to $800—for purported debt relief 
services without contacting the borrowers’ lenders). 
79. See, e.g., id. at *5. 
80. See, e.g., id. 
81. See, e.g., Complaint at 10–11, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Consumer Advoc. Ctr., Inc., 
No. 8:19-cv-01998 JVS, 2019 WL 5721909 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2019) (joining the lawsuits as plaintiffs 
are state attorneys general from Minnesota and North Carolina and the city attorney from the City of 
Los Angeles). 
82. See, e.g., id. at 14.  
83. Id. at 4, 14. 
84. See id. at 14.  
85. Id. at 11, 14 (alleging that after submitting IDR applications, defendants changed each 
borrower’s email address “in order to temporarily divert all email correspondence from the consumer’s 
to the [borrower’s] student-loan servicer”). 
86. Id. at 11. 
87. Marcus E. Howard, Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson Sues Company Allegedly 
Promising Student Loan Debt ‘Forgiveness,’ STAR TRIB. ( July 1, 2015, 9:46 PM), http://
www.startribune.com/attorney-general-sues-company-allegedly-promising-student-loan-debt-
forgiveness/311248281/ [https://perma.cc/4AUK-RKNN]; Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, 
at 5–6; Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 12, FTC v. Good EBusiness, 
LLC, No. 2:16-CV-01048 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (promising loan forgiveness). 
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to the company for almost two years.88 Under the legitimate Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness (PSLF) program, borrowers must make payments to their loan 
servicers while employed in public service positions for ten years to receive 
forgiveness of student loan debt remaining at the end that period.89 Student 
Consulting Group had only used Ms. Hamblen’s loan account information to get 
the servicer to consolidate her student loans, thereby causing her debt to increase.90 
Ms. Hamblen could have requested a consolidation from the loan servicer on her 
own for free.91 When relief companies indiscriminately consolidate all loans, such 
consolidation usually results in higher debt for the borrower.92 Student Consulting 
Group, therefore, did not provide any meaningful service.93 Moreover, because of 
the company’s actions, Ms. Hamblen still needed to get certified by a legitimate loan 
servicer so that she could start the ten-year clock for purposes of obtaining  
loan forgiveness.94 
D. Claim Falsely That Borrowers Must Act Quickly to Obtain Debt Relief  
To persuade borrowers to sign up quickly for their forgiveness and debt 
reduction programs, relief companies create a sense of urgency to act immediately 
and promise to obtain fast and easy results.95 For example, a group of defendants 
 
88. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 12–13, Illinois v. Student Consulting 
Grp., Inc., No. 2015-CH-07260, 2015 WL 2338768 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 4, 2015) [hereinafter Student 
Consulting Group Complaint ]. 
89. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2012). For an in-depth discussion of the PSLF program, see 
Gregory Crespi, The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program: The Need for Better Employment Eligibility 
Regulations, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 819 (2018). 
90. Student Consulting Group Complaint, supra note 88, at 13; see, e.g., Second Amended 
Complaint at 14–15, New York v. Debt Resolve, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 3d 358 (S.D.N.Y  2019)  
(No. 18-9812) [hereinafter Debt Resolve Complaint ] (alleging that consolidation not only causes the 
borrower’s total loan balance to increase but “may also cause the loss of certain benefits associated 
with the original loans”). 
91. See, e.g., Beware: You Never Have to Pay for Help with Student Loans, supra note 62;  
FTC v. All. Document Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (stating that many 
consumers are “upset” when they discover they could get assistance for free and that “[e]ven if a 
borrower is aware of the ability to freely enroll in the Department of Education’s programs, 
[d]efendants attempt to dissuade them from doing so by severely overstating the difficulty of the 
application process”); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Cracks Down on Debt Relief Schemes 
Targeting Student Loan and Mortgage Borrowers (May 25, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2016/05/ftc-cracks-down-debt-relief-schemes-targeting-student-loan [https://perma.cc/ 
7QJT-6K3E] (stating that a Florida-based company told borrowers that it could eliminate at least 50% 
to 70% of a borrower’s loan balance). 
92. See, e.g., Debt Resolve Complaint, supra note 90.  
93. See, e.g., Student Consulting Group Complaint, supra note 88, at 4–5. 
94. See id. at 12–13. 
95. Anna Helhoski & Teddy Nykiel, How to Spot Student Loan Scams, NERDWALLET ( July 28, 
2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/loans/student-loans/how-to-spot-student-loan-scam 
[https://perma.cc/H29W-NRB3]; see Lesley Fair, Game of Loans: The Stark Truth About Student Loan 
“Debt Relief” Claims, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Oct. 13, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/10/game-loans-stark-truth-about-student-loan- 
debt-relief-claims [https://perma.cc/6N55-2A3U]. 
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posing as the Education Department invoked fear of the consequences of the 
presidential election of Donald Trump in November 2016 to convince borrowers 
to act quickly.96 The defendants urged borrowers to call back within twenty-four 
hours by falsely stating that all student loan forgiveness programs would stop 
immediately as soon as Trump took office.97 Given President Trump’s immediate 
post-inauguration actions, including the controversial appointment of Betsy DeVos 
as the Secretary of the Education Department,98 relief companies could have 
convinced consumers that they needed to act quickly and sign up for the program.99 
As evidence of the defendants’ success, the defendants originally agreed to pay the 
FTC a settlement amount of nine million dollars, representing gross revenues they 
received from perpetrating unlawful debt relief scams.100  
E. Misrepresent Their Ability to Reverse the Consequences of Borrowers’ Default  
Targeting borrowers who have already missed loan payments, some 
companies falsely represent that they can reverse the negative consequences of a 
borrower defaulting on his or her student loan.101 The Education Department has 
a legitimate loan rehabilitation program for borrowers to make certain payments to 
cure loan defaults.102 Lacking any authority whatsoever, relief companies 
nevertheless bait borrowers by promising that they can improve borrowers’ credit 
scores,103 stop garnishment of borrowers’ wages, and even stop the IRS from 
intercepting borrowers’ tax refunds.104 For example, Minnesota’s enforcement 
action against Student Aid Center identified several victims, including a borrower 
living in Blaine, Illinois, who had defaulted on $67,000 in student loan debt.105 He 
 
96. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 12, FTC v. A1 
DocPrep Inc., 296 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (No. LA17CV07044-SJO( JCx)), 2017 WL 
4551515 [hereinafter A1 DocPrep Complaint ]. 
97. See, e.g., id. 
98. See Emma Brown, With Historic Tiebreaker from Pence, DeVos Confirmed as Education 
Secretary, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/senate-to-
vote-today-on-confirmation-of-betsy-DeVos/2017/02/06/fd4b7e9c-ec85-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_ 
story.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/F5K5-FPAQ]. For a discussion of the harmful actions 
taken by Secretary DeVos, see infra notes 245–289 and accompanying text.  
99. See generally FTC v. All. Document Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2017) 
(quoting the defendant’s transcript, in which the defendant claimed that “[t]he fastest option is also the 
cheapest option”). 
100. See Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgement, FTC v. A1 
DocPrep Inc., No. 2:17-cv-07044 (C.D. Cal. Nov 16, 2018).  
101. See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 4, Illinois v. Interactiv Educ., LLC,  
No. 15-CH-118, 2015 WL 10890661 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 4, 2015); see also Student Consulting Group 
Complaint, supra note 88, at 5 (alleging that relief company falsely claimed to restore consumers’ 
eligibility for financial aid so that they can, for example, apply for federal loans to attend  
graduate school). 
102. See Illinois v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 71. 
103. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 15, Illinois v. FDATR, Inc.,  
No. 2017-CH-13732, 2017 WL 4611807 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 2017). 
104. Id. at 14. 
105. See Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, at 13 (identifying the victim as K.C.). 
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agreed to pay an upfront fee of $99, along with a monthly program fee, after a 
Student Aid Center representative told him that the company could stop wage 
garnishments, restore his loan to current status, and discharge $20,000 of his debt.106 
After making two payments, his paycheck was once again garnished by the debt 
collector.107 The relief company’s promises were therefore completely false.108 
II. RELIEF COMPANIES WEAPONIZE MODERN TECHNOLOGY TO DUPE 
CONSUMER BORROWERS  
Having provided the reader with an overview of the common fraudulent 
representations made by relief companies, this Part of the Article demonstrates how 
relief companies can reach millions by weaponizing modern technology against 
them. Roughly twenty years ago, relief companies had to spend substantial amounts 
of money and time on hiring a workforce to target student loan borrowers through 
the U.S. mailing system and landline telephones.109 Through modern technology, 
however, relief companies can inexpensively (1) make millions of robocalls with 
prerecorded advertisements;110 (2) send millions of messages via email and cell 
phone text;111 (3) advertise through optimized online search results;112 (4) create 
websites with memorable domain names and content;113 (5) promote phony relief 
on social media platforms;114 (6) “scrape” borrowers’ social media to target them 
individually;115 and (7) require borrowers to sign documents, which disclose 
sensitive financial information, electronically.116  
A. Make Millions of Robocalls That Advertise Student Loan Relief Programs 
Because the cost of telecommunication services has become relatively 
inexpensive, one person alone can easily and quickly make millions of calls to phone 
numbers in the United States to perpetrate fraud.117 The Telephone Consumer 
 
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. See id.  
109. See generally FTC Hearing, supra note 37. 
110. See infra notes 120–129 and accompanying text. 
111. See infra notes 130–134 and accompanying text. 
112. See infra notes 135–140 and accompanying text. 
113. See infra notes 141–147 and accompanying text. 
114. See infra notes 148–161 and accompanying text. 
115. See infra notes 162–177 and accompanying text. 
116. See infra notes 178–195 and accompanying text. 
117. See, e.g., Stuart L. Pardau, Good Intentions and the Road to Regulatory Hell: How the TCPA 
Went from Consumer Protection Statute to Litigation Nightmare, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 313, 315 
(2018); Interview by Svetlana S. Gans, with Joseph Simons, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2019, at 1, 5 (stating that it is “cheap and easy” for fraudsters to make  
robo-calls anonymously and from overseas); Alina Selyukh, Man Accused of Making Millions of Robocalls 
Faces Biggest-Ever FCC Fine, NPR: THE TWO-WAY ( June 22, 2017, 5:05 PM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/22/533970545/man-accused-of-making-millions-of-robocalls-faces-
biggest-ever-fcc-fine [https://perma.cc/F2JV-9SP6] (discussing one man who made millions of 
robocalls in a little over three months). 
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Protection Act (TCPA) prohibits calls, commonly referred to as robocalls, when the 
caller uses an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) or uses a prerecorded 
voice to deliver a message without first obtaining the recipient’s prior written 
consent.118 With limited exceptions, unsolicited robocalls that market services and 
goods are illegal.119 
Robocalls offering debt relief, including relief from student loans, are among 
the most common types of calls on the list of robocall complaints.120 In an 
enforcement action against a group of defendants doing business under various 
names, including “Student Loan Help Direct” and “Select Student Loan Help,” the 
FTC alleged that the defendants made numerous unsolicited telemarketing calls, in 
which they promised significantly reduced payments.121 
Similarly, an FTC enforcement action was filed against James Christiano and 
several corporations and individuals for allegedly facilitating the transmission of 
billions of illegal robocalls, selling an array of services, including student loan 
relief.122 The magnitude of the calls alone is concerning, but the defendants allegedly 
made millions of robocalls to numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry!123 
 
118. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Scammers often combine spoofing technology with 
robocalling technology to target consumers but they are not the same. See infra notes 124–129 and 
accompanying text. The FTC and the Federal Communications Commission receive the most 
consumer complaints about robocalls. See FTC Hearing, supra note 37, at 17; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY DATA BOOK 2018: COMPLAINT FIGURES BY YEAR (2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-staff-reports/national-do-not-call-
registry-data-book-fy-9 [https://perma.cc/QBZ4-ZMP4] (reporting that in 2018, the FTC received 
more than 3.7 million complaints about robo-calls); CONSUMER & GOVERNMENTAL AFFS. BUREAU, 
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 17-59, REPORT ON ROBOCALLS (2019) [hereinafter FCC 
REPORT ON ROBOCALLS ], https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356196A1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/M2T5-HTDB] (reporting that in 2018 the FCC received 232,000 complaints regarding 
unwanted calls, including robocalls). Billions of robocalls are made annually in the United States. See 
Gary Guthrie, 2019: The Year of the Robocall, CONSUMERAFFAIRS ( Jan. 17, 2020), https://
www.consumeraffairs.com/news/2019-the-year-of-the-robocall-011720.html [https://perma.cc/ 
GB7E-HDN9] (reporting that the 58.5 billion robocalls made in 2019 was a 22% increase from the 
number of robocalls made in 2018). 
119. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i) (exempting calls made during an emergency or with the 
recipient’s prior express consent). Legitimate companies, including student loan servicers, can violate 
federal law by making unlawful robocalls. For example, over the years, Navient Solutions, LLC, 
formerly Sallie Mae and the largest loan servicer, has been sued several times for making millions of 
unlawful robocalls. See, e.g., Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Coleman v. Navient Sols., LLC, 
No. 2:19-cv-14123-RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2019); Tony Romm, Robo-calls, at Record High, Could Get a 
Lot Worse, WASH. POST, July 13, 2018, at A17 (reporting that Navient has lobbied for fewer restrictions 
on robo-calling and that it settled for $2.5 million in a class-action lawsuit alleging that it made repeated 
unlawful robo-calls to consumers’ smartphones). 
120. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 118.  
121. See FTC v. Good EBusiness, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-01048-ODW-JPR, 2016 WL 3704489, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 12, 2016). 
122. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, FTC v. Christiano, 
No. 8:18-cv-00936, 2018 WL 2463244 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2018) [hereinafter FTC  
v. Christiano Complaint ]. 
123. Id. at 22–23 (alleging that the defendants’ software facilitated in excess of 93 million 
outbound calls to phone numbers listed on the DNC Registry).  
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To make it more likely that financially distressed borrowers will answer the 
robocall (by pressing “1” to be connected to a live person), some relief companies 
use spoofing technology.124 This technology allows the company to conceal its true 
identity by blocking its actual number from a caller ID display and then exhibiting 
someone else’s phone number (e.g., the IRS’s number) on consumers’ phones.125  
The FTC charged the previously mentioned Mr. Christiano and his 
codefendants with using a more effective type of spoofing, known as “neighbor 
spoofing,” to make robocalls.126 With this type of spoofing, the company uses a 
telephone number that has a local area code and three-digit exchange (e.g.,  
614-545-XXXX) that are the same as a consumer’s phone number so that the 
consumer thinks the call is coming from someone in his or her city or town.127 
Consumers are more likely to answer a call from an unknown local number than 
other types of unknown numbers because that local number looks familiar.128 The 
FTC alleged that Mr. Christiano and his codefendants violated federal law when 
they used neighbor spoofing to make fifty-four million robocalls marketing phony 
student loan relief and other services.129  
 
124. Id. at 19–20.  
125. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Rachel DePompa, “It Can Be Dangerous”: Scammers Up Their Robocalls 
Game, NBC12 (Aug. 20, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://www.nbc12.com/story/38919782/it-can-be-
dangerous-scammers-up-their-robocalls-game/ [https://perma.cc/8S5S-V52P] (interviewing the 
owner of a real estate company who complained that his business phone number had been used in 
spoofed robo-calls by another company marketing student loan scams). 
126. FTC v. Christiano Complaint, supra note 122, at 3, 18–19. In 2019, the FTC was successful 
in obtaining a settlement against Mr. Christiano and his codefendants that shut down their operations 
and imposed liability in the amount of $1.35 million. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC 
Crackdown Stops Operations Responsible for Billions of Illegal Robocalls (Mar. 26, 2019), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/ftc-crackdown-stops-operations-responsible-
billions-illegal [https://perma.cc/N7V5-MMCU]; see Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction 
and Civil Penalty Judgment at 6, FTC v. Christiano, No. 8:18-cv-00936 DOC (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019). 
127. FTC v. Christiano Complaint, supra note 122, at 18–19. 
128. Id.; Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Consumer Alert: Protect Yourself Against 
‘Neighbor Spoofing,’ Scam Callers Placing Phone Calls That Appear to be Local (Mar. 8, 2018),  
https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0308/DOC-349632A1.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/B7JP-ZZRF] (“[S]cammers use such [neighbor] spoofing to increase the likelihood 
that consumers pick up the phone and to increase the consumer’s trust in the call.”); see also FCC 
REPORT ON ROBOCALLS, supra note 118, at 6 (predicting a dramatic increase in the number of 
“neighbor spoofing” calls). 
129. FTC v. Christiano Complaint, supra note 122, at 18–19 (alleging that, of the millions of 
robocalls sent using neighbor spoofing technology, nearly 8,000 complaints were made to the FTC 
from consumers harassed by such calls). Relief companies that rely on robocalling and call-spoofing 
technologies invariably violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act when they make robocalls, 
spoof caller ID systems, and call telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call (DNC) Registry. See, 
e.g., id. at 4-5; see also 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (making it unlawful for any person “to initiate any 
telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a 
message without the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency 
purposes . . . .”); 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(8) (2019) (making it unlawful to use technology to spoof caller 
ID systems to conceal from consumers the actual numbers from which the defendants were calling); 
id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (prohibiting sellers and telemarketers from initiating an outbound telephone call 
to numbers on the DNC Registry). 
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B. Send Unsolicited Email and Text Messages That Target Student Loan Borrowers 
Besides targeting financially distressed borrowers with millions of spoofed 
robocalls, some companies send millions of email and cell phone messages to target 
vulnerable consumers.130 For instance, an FTC complaint alleged that A1 DocPrep 
Inc. (A1), doing business under several names, including Project Uplift Students, 
sent email messages claiming to be from the Department of Education and 
promising loan forgiveness.131 A1 also sent millions of unsolicited text messages, 
including the following: “Your Student loan may be forgiven today, but Donald 
Trump may stop that[,] call now at 888-307-0680.”132  
While A1’s message may appear suspect on its face,133 some borrowers may 
have had difficulty discerning whether a text message was from a fraudulent relief 
company or from a legitimate loan servicing company that is authorized to collect 
student loan debt on behalf of the government. This is because loan servicers and 
other companies with federal contracts (through the Education Department) have 
the legal right to pursue debt collection by making calls and sending text messages 
to a borrower’s cell phone.134  
C. Optimize Online Search Engines to Lead Borrowers to Companies’ Websites  
When text messages are insufficient to target consumers, companies can pay 
for advertisements to appear at the top of search engines, like Google or Bing, to 
target consumers with student loan relief scams.135 For instance, Student Aid Center 
successfully targeted borrowers nationwide by paying Google for optimized search 
results based on users searching with certain key phrases.136 If, for example, a 
 
130. See, e.g., A1 DocPrep Complaint, supra note 96, at 7–8. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 13; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remaining Operators of Student Debt 
Relief Scheme Settle FTC Charges (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2018/11/remaining-operators-student-debt-relief-scheme-settle-ftc-charges [https://perma.cc/
C33T-DMYH] (reporting that A1 and its co-defendants settled with the FTC by agreeing to a judgment 
exceeding $9 million). 
133. See A1 DocPrep Complaint, supra note 96, at 7. 
134. See generally Stauffer v. Navient Sols., LLC, 241 F. Supp. 3d 517 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (holding 
that student loan servicer did not violate the TCPA and relying in part on the Federal Communications 
Commission’s interpretation that consent will be “deemed to be granted” based on the consumer 
providing the creditor with his or her number in connection with debt-related transaction). 
135. See, e.g., Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, at 5; Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
at 23, Washinton v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., No. 16-2-11955-7, 2017 WL 6039589 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 
29, 2017) [hereinafter Wash. S.J. Motion ]; Sandra Guy, Madigan Files Lawsuits Against Companies She 
Says Prey on Students, CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 4, 2015, 7:23 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2015/
5/4/18561166/madigan-sues-companies-she-says-prey-on-students [https://perma.cc/5UJV-Z93B] 
(describing how Ruth Varela, a 34-year-old single mother of three children and Illinois resident, 
searched on Google for help and found a relief company that duped her into paying an upfront fee of 
$399 and several monthly payments of $79). 
136. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 6–7, FTC  
v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1324 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-21843-FAM) 
[hereinafter FTC v. Student Aid Ctr. Complaint ]; see, e.g., FTC v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 
1324, 1330–31 (S.D. Fla. 2016). 
First to Printer_Johnson _EH Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  12:58 PM 
2020] RELIEF FOR STUDENT LOAN BORROWERS 125 
consumer searched for “student loan forgiveness,” Student Aid Center’s website 
appeared at the top as a sponsored search result on Google, and the consumer 
would see a hyperlink titled “Obama Loan Forgiveness.”137 Student Aid’s 
advertising strategy that labeled clickable links as “Obama Loan Forgiveness” 
targeted young borrowers,138 who comprise a substantial percentage of the  
forty-four million student loan borrowers.139 Student Aid Center’s keyword 
searches made it more likely that searchers would click on the link to its website 
because it appeared at the top of the results page.140  
D. Create Websites with False Testimonials and Approval of Others  
Once consumers click on the link to a relief company’s website, they 
encounter professional-looking webpages that, often, feature testimonials or 
representations from purported customers.141 For instance, the defendants, 
operating a website with the domain name “aidingstudents.com,” included a 
purported testimonial from an entrepreneur, 142 who claimed the company saved 
him $250 per month.143 Similarly, websites for Student Aid Center claimed that it 
had helped thousands and featured young-looking individuals with captions such as 
“Forgiveness for Teachers” and “Forgiveness for Nurses.”144  
In addition to having positive testimonials at their websites, some relief 
companies include pictures and logos at their websites to create the inference that 
 
137. See, e.g., Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, at 5; see also Student Aid Ctr., Inc., 281  
F. Supp. 3d at 1330–31 (affirming the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss where the FTC 
sufficiently alleged that the defendants made telemarketing calls to consumers who responded 
responding to the defendants’ advertisements on the Internet, social media, and radio). 
138. See, e.g., Tom Rosentiel, Young Voters in the 2008 Election, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 13, 
2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1031/young_voters-in-the-2008-election [https://perma.cc/
8VNT-7W7N] (reporting that 66% of voters under the age of 30 voted in the first presidential election 
of Barack Obama). 
139. Millennials at Risk for Loan Defaults in Next 12 Months: UBS, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2017, 
11:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-millennials-defaults/millennials-at-risk-for-loan-
defaults-in-next-12-months-ubs-idUSKBN17S2JZ [https://perma.cc/H4R8-LM93].  
140. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 150–51 (4th Cir. 2012) (describing 
how companies pay for ads and sponsored links to appear at the top of a results page based on a set of 
keyword searches and stating that searchers are more likely to click on links appearing at the top of the 
results page). 
141. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 6, FTC  
v. Student Debt Doctor, LLC, No. 0:17-cv-61937-WPD (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2017). 
142. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 8–9, FTC  
v. Impetus Enter., No. 8:18-cv-01987-JLS-KES (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) [hereinafter FTC v. Impetus 
Complaint ]; see, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Add New Defendants in Student 
Debt Relief Case (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftc-
seeks-add-new-defendants-student-debt-relief-case [https://perma.cc/9PV3-GTKP]. 
143. FTC v. Impetus Complaint, supra note 142, at 9.  
144. See Plaintiff Motion & Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, 
FTC v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-21843-FAM (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ 
Motion Against SAC]; FTC’s Operation Game of Loans, supra note 59. 
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reputable organizations approve of their debt relief programs.145 For instance, 
websites for “Aiding Student Relief” claimed that the Wall Street Journal and 
Forbes Magazine featured its services.146 Likewise, websites for Student Aid Center 
prominently featured the logos of several television networks, implying that its 
programs had obtained positive media coverage “as reported on” CNN, ABC, Fox, 
and NBC News.147  
E. Advertise via Social Media Platforms to Target Borrowers 
In addition to attracting borrowers to their websites, relief companies 
effectively target financially distressed borrowers through Facebook and other 
social media platforms.148 Once again, Student Aid Center is notable because it 
targeted consumers via advertising on social media, including Instagram.149  
Similarly, Alliance Document Preparation and several related companies 
(Alliance defendants)150 primarily advertised using Facebook to target borrowers 
that had attended for-profit schools such as DeVry University, ITT Tech (now 
defunct), University of Phoenix, and The Art Institutes.151 One Facebook ad 
instructed borrowers to call to see if they qualified “for loan forgiveness due to the 
recent litigation against The Art Institutes.”152 This marketing strategy referred to a 
legitimate regulation, known as the borrower defense to repayment rule, 
implemented during President Obama’s administration to allow attendees of alleged 
unscrupulous for-profit schools to apply to the Education Department for a 
 
145. See FTC v. Impetus Complaint, supra note 142, at 21–22; see Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, FTC Halts Deceptive Student Debt Relief Scheme that Bilked Consumers Out of Millions 
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/11/ftc-halts-deceptive-
student-debt-relief-scheme-bilked-consumers [https://perma.cc/U2LT-EMRQ]. 
146. FTC v. Impetus Complaint, supra note 142, at 21–22. 
147. See Plaintiffs’ Motion Against SAC, supra note 144, at 7; see also FTC v. Student Aid  
Ctr. Complaint, supra note 136, at 8; Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 4, Illinois v. Interactiv 
Educ., LLC, No. 15CH118, 2015 WL 10890661 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 4, 2015) (alleging that “defendants 
advertise[d] on multiple television stations, including, but not limited to, ESPN Networks, BET 
Networks, MTV, and Bounce TV”). 
148. See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. IrvineWebWorks, No. 8:14-cv-01967-JVS-DFM, 
2016 WL 1056662, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (granting the CFPB’s motion for partial summary 
judgment against defendants that maintained social media accounts that falsely claimed they worked 
with the U.S. Department of Education). 
149. See FTC v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (denying 
defendants’ motion to dismiss on several counts); Pam Zekman, 2 Investigators: Scam Artists Target 
Millennials with Offers of College-Debt Relief, CBS CHI. (Nov. 17, 2016, 10:10 PM), https://
chicago.cbslocal.com/2016/11/17/2-investigators-scam-artists-target-millennials-offering-college-
debt-relief/ [https://perma.cc/UE7P-BZQ4] (reporting that Student Aid Center advertises on social 
media sites like Facebook). 
150. FTC v. All. Document Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (issuing 
an injunction against the relief company). 
151. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 9, 11, All. Document 
Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (No. 2:17-cv-07048-SJO-KS) [hereinafter FTC v. All. Document 
Preparation Complaint ] (alleging that “in exchange for the promised student loan debt relief, 
Defendants have charged illegal upfront fees of as much as $1000”). 
152. Id. at 11. 
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discharge of their student loan debts.153 Consequently, some for-profit alumni 
erroneously concluded that the Alliance defendants could obtain a debt discharge 
for them.154 
Some companies exploit young borrowers’ trust in social media by posting 
fake reviews.155 For instance, Jamie Bussey, while searching online, found reviews 
about Consumer Assistance Project (CAP)156 and attempted to figure out if the 
company was legitimate.157 She uncovered positive reviews and erroneously 
concluded that CAP was legitimate.158 The reviews she uncovered were almost 
certainly fake159 because a former CAP supervisor testified that CAP not only paid 
Google for targeted advertisements based on keyword searches but also created and 
posted fake five-star-rated reviews on Facebook.160 Falling for the fake reviews,  
Ms. Bussey paid $250 as an upfront fee and $198 per month for two years before 
she found out the company had only put her loan in deferment status.161  
 
153. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.206(c)(2) (2016); see also Calvillo Manriquez v. DeVos, 345 F. Supp. 3d 
1077, 1085–86 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting in part plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and ordering 
the U.S. Department of Education to cease attempts to collect on federal student loan debt incurred by 
borrowers who attended Corinthian Colleges, the defunct, because it had violated privacy laws by using 
borrowers’ Social Security Administration data to calculate loan forgiveness); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Announces Final Regulations to Protect Students and Taxpayers from 
Predatory Institutions (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-
education-announces-final-regulations-protect-students-and-taxpayers-predatory-institutions [https:// 
perma.cc/5Q79-QP4Q]. 
154. FTC v. All. Document Preparation Complaint, supra note 151, at 12. The defendants 
settled after a federal court issued a preliminary injunction against them. See All. Document Preparation, 
296 F. Supp. 3d at 1198; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Student Debt Relief Operators Agree to 
Settle FTC Charges (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/09/
student-debt-relief-operators-agree-settle-ftc-charges [https://perma.cc/MU37-G2RL] (alleging that 
the defendants were unjustly enriched over $19 million from its relief scheme targeting alumni of  
for-profit schools through social media). 
155. See Read, supra note 65.  
156. Id.  
157. Id.  
158. Id.  
159. See Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment, F.T.C. File  
No. 152 3086 (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170124_ 
consumer_assistance_permt_inj.pdf [https://perma.cc/89BJ-YHLE]. 
160. See Read, supra note 65 (describing a favorable Facebook review from “Kym Zaring,” who 
claimed the company was able to wipe out over $60,000 in student loan debt). 
161. Id. (stating that Robert Greenberg, who trained CAP’s employees, marveled at how 
successful the fake Facebook reviews were in driving up “membership” fees); see also Leticia Miranda, 
People Are Falling For These Wild Student Forgiveness Scams, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016, 1:10 
PM) https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/leticiamiranda/student-debt-relief-scams-are-getting-
worse [https://perma.cc/SD6F-5CFS] (reporting that a 31-year-old mom in Kentucky paid for 
fraudulent services after she saw a positive review posted by a friend on Facebook for a company called 
Liberty Tax and Student Loan Defense); Benjamin Cox, Student Loan Company Ordered to Stop Doing 
Business in Kentucky, JD SUPRA (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/student-loan-
company-ordered-to-stop-26865/ [https://perma.cc/XME7-2D5S] (reporting that the Kentucky 
Attorney General sued this Florida-based company and obtained a court order banning it from doing 
business in Kentucky). 
First to Printer_Johnson _EH Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  12:58 PM 
128 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:105 
F. Scrape Borrowers’ Social Media Information to Target Borrowers by Name  
Besides posting fake reviews on social media, some relief companies “scrape” 
social media profiles to personally target borrowers. This disturbing practice came 
to light in the FTC’s lawsuit against Brandon Frere (Frere), American Financial 
Benefits Center, and related defendants.162 Consider the following account by two 
consumers. In early 2018, Gloria Holmes, a Tennessee resident, received in the mail 
what she described as a “strange postcard,”163 which had a photo of Ms. Holmes 
and had her first and last name in cursive.164 Across the top were the words 
“STUDENT LOAN PAYMENT REDUCTION AND FORGIVENESS.”165 She 
recognized the photo immediately because she had previously posted it on her 
Facebook account.166 The postcard also contained the name “American Financial,” 
stated a loan balance of $30,000, identified the loan type as “Federal Student Loan,” 
contained an account reference number, and included a toll-free number.167 At the 
time she received the postcard, Ms. Holmes remembered that she had previously 
made her Facebook settings “private.”168 As a result, she wondered how American 
Financial obtained her photo and her loan information.169 She recalled that she had 
not searched for help with her student loans.170 Alarmed by it all, Ms. Holmes stated, 
“I felt scared that a random company had gone through my [private] Facebook 
account. [I]t made me feel like I was being stalked.” 171 She contacted the company 
and voiced her complaint about the postcard to “Scott,” who retorted,“Everything 
we do is legal. [You have] a beautiful family.”172  
Like Ms. Holmes, Melissa Bussewitz,173 a New York resident, also received a 
postcard, which had on it a photograph of her and her daughter reflected in a 
“creepy man’s glasses.”174 The postcard had a photo of the two women 
superimposed over sun eyeglasses worn by the actor Laurence Fishburne as 
depicted in a popular science fiction movie called “The Matrix.” 
 
162. See American Financial Inj. Order, supra note 16.  
163. See Declaration of Gloria Holmes in Support of FTC’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr., No. 4:18-cv-00806-SBA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) [hereinafter 
Declaration of Gloria Holmes ]. 
164. Id.  
165. See id. 
166. Id.  






173. See Declaration of Melissa Bussewitz in Support of FTC’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 1, FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr., No. 4:18-sv-00806-SBA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018). 
174. Id. 
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Realizing that the photo came from her Facebook profile, Ms. Bussewitz filed 
a complaint against the company with the Better Business Bureau stating that she 
felt the postcard was “a gross invasion of privacy.”175  
Ms. Bussewitz and Ms. Holmes concluded American Financial was not 
legitimate because it scraped their social media accounts.176 But, over 40,000 
borrowers apparently thought American Financial was offering legitimate services 
and were eventually duped into paying roughly sixty million dollars for  
phony relief.177  
G. Require Borrowers to E-Sign Documents That Disclose Sensitive Personal and 
Financial Information  
Further leveraging modern technology, relief companies routinely get 
borrowers to sign contracts and other documents, which require the disclosure of 
sensitive information, electronically.178 Relief companies require such disclosures so 
that they can fraudulently debit the borrowers’ bank accounts179 or charge their 
credit cards180 for bogus upfront fees. 
Student Consulting Group obscured what it was actually doing by having 
borrowers e-sign a contract181 that included a “power of attorney” form so that the 
company could ostensibly act on the borrower’s behalf.182 However, the ultimate 
goal was to secure borrowers’ agreement allowing electronic debits to withdraw 
monthly payments from the borrowers’ bank accounts.183  
 
175. Id. 
176. Id.; Declaration of Gloria Holmes, supra note 163. 
177. See American Financial Inj. Order, supra note 16, at 4, 11 (defendants alleging that they 
have “helped a total of 41,805 borrowers”). 
178. See infra notes 179–195 and accompanying text; FTC’s Operation Game of Loans, supra 
note 59 (stating that relief companies deceived customers into providing Social Security numbers and 
Federal Student Aid identification information). 
179. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Elegant 
Sols., Inc., No. SACV19-01333-JVS-KESx (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2019) (alleging that borrowers e-sign 
documents that allowed the defendants to debit borrowers’ bank accounts for unlawful upfront fees 
ranging from $100 to $500). 
180. See Updated Joint Case Management & Proposed Order, supra note 16, at 3 (alleged that 
the defendants unlawfully charged borrowers’ credit cards for monthly payments (up to $99)). 
181. See Student Consulting Group Complaint, supra note 88, at 9 (alleging that “[d]efendant 
requires consumers to provide personal and financial information including: name, address, driver’s 
license number, employer’s name and location, two personal references, annual income, tax filing status, 
spouse information, and the consumer’s unique NSLDS pin code”). 
182. Id. at 10. 
183. Id. The previously mentioned CAC also had borrowers e-sign contracts that purportedly 
put borrowers’ payments into third-party trust accounts, to be paid to CAC only after the company had 
performed satisfactory service. See Complaint at 15, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Consumer  
Advoc. Ctr., No. 8:19-cv-01998 JVS, 2019 WL 5721909 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2019). However, authorities 
alleged that the purported trust accounts were actually controlled by entities related to CAC and the 
deposited money was eventually paid out to the defendants without borrowers obtaining the promised 
debt relief service. Id. 
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Because some borrowers lack the money to pay hefty upfront fees,184 a few 
relief companies have concocted a financing scheme to collect upfront fees.185 
Equitable Acceptance Corporation (EAC), a finance company, was recently 
exposed as a central figure in four separate enforcement actions against relief 
companies.186 Different corporate entities and individuals assumed the primary role 
in baiting consumer borrowers with promises of relief; however, a cash-strapped 
borrower would eventually be asked to e-sign a document packet, which, among 
other things, included an agreement that resulted in a new loan from EAC.187 
Besides e-signing documents that result in borrowers unwittingly obtaining 
new loans, borrowers routinely e-sign documents that require their disclosure of 
their federal student loan account information.188 This loan account information 
includes the borrower’s account number, username, and password, all of which 
enabled relief companies to gain access to the borrower’s online accounts through 
the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS).189 Federal law protects a 
borrower’s account information on the NSLDS, and the Education Department 
only allows authorized entities access to that information; relief companies are not 
authorized entities.190  
 
184. See, e.g., Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, at 10 (charging borrowers fees ranging 
from $500 to $1,500); FTC v. All. Document Preparation, 296 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2017) 
(holding that defendants violated Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(I) (2018), by 
charging upfront one-time fee of $499 before doing any services). 
185. See Lesley Fair, FTC Sues Marketers of Student Loan “Debt Relief” – and Financer Who 
Helped It Happen, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Sept. 12, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/09/ftc-sues-marketers-student-loan-debt-
relief-financer-who [https://perma.cc/J54P-KPHU] (describing how consumers were misled into 
paying fees by getting financing through a third-party lender). 
186. See, e.g., People v. Debt Resolve, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 3d 358, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (describing 
EAC’s financing of upfront fees charged to borrowers by various relief companies, holding that the 
attorney general had sufficiently pled that EAC played a “direct role in the fraudulent scheme”) 
(emphasis in the original). 
187. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 16, FTC  
v. Student Advocates Team, LLC, No. 8:19-cv-1728 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2019) (alleging that EAC 
violated several laws, including the Truth in Lending Act, by failing to disclose finance charges for loans 
ranging from $1,300 to $1,400 and obligating the borrowers to make monthly payments ranging from 
$39 to $49 to EAC); see also Complaint at 16, FTC v. Manhattan Beach Venture, LLC,  
No. 2:19-cv-07849 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2019) (alleging same); Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, 
Williams v. Equitable Acceptance Corp., No. 1:18-cv-07537-NRB (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2019) [hereinafter 
Williams’ Am. Complaint ]; Memorandum in Opposition to Equitable Acceptance Corp.’s Motion to 
Dismiss the RICO Claims in the Amended Class Action Complaint at 9, Williams v. Equitable 
Acceptance Corp., No. 1:18-cv-07537 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2019) (explaining that after plaintiff told the 
relief company that she did not have any money to pay its upfront fee, plaintiff unwittingly e-signed 
documents that resulted in her agreeing to borrow that fee amount from EAC at an annual percentage 
rate of 21 percent). 
188. See, e.g., Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, at 16–17. 
189. Id.  
190. Id.; see also Beware: You Never Have to Pay for Help with Student Loans, supra note 62 
(warning borrowers that the Education Department and its authorized loan servicers will never ask for 
a borrower’s password or other log-in information). 
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Relief companies routinely obtain borrowers’ loan account information, 
change their passwords and contact information (e.g., email address), and then take 
control of their loan accounts.191 For example, Brandon Frere, the owner of 
American Financial, was criminally charged with wire fraud as a result of his practice 
of taking over borrowers’ loan accounts.192 After obtaining borrowers’ login 
information, Mr. Frere used American Financial and related companies to remove 
borrowers’ email addresses and replace them with 
AFBC.Confirmation@afcenter.com as the contact email address for 199 borrowers 
with one single loan servicer.193 By replacing the borrowers’ email address, Mr. Frere 
was able to conceal his fraudulent activity for a long time.194 For instance, Mr. Frere 
used American Financial to keep one consumer’s student loan in forbearance for 
fifteen months and, due to the accrual of interest, his outstanding loan balance 
increased from approximately $70,000 to $75,000.195  
Based on the foregoing, American Financial and other relief companies 
effectively deploy various forms of modern technology to defraud borrowers of 
millions. As explained in the next section, justification exists for federal and state 
lawmakers to enact new legislation to curb student loan relief scams.  
III. JUSTIFICATION EXISTS FOR PASSAGE OF NEW LEGISLATION TO DETER 
STUDENT LOAN RELIEF SCAMS  
While federal and state authorities have been successful in shutting down 
about three dozen relief companies,196 lawmakers need to do more to protect 
borrowers from student loan relief scams.197 As discussed below, three main 
arguments exist to justify the enactment of additional regulation to afford greater 
protection to borrowers from relief scams. First, until loan servicers are held liable 
in one of the numerous pending cases filed against them, loan servicers cannot be 
trusted to self-regulate.198 Second, the Education Department, under new leadership 
 
191. See Criminal Complaint at 13, United States v. Frere, No. 3:18-mj-71724-SK, 2018 WL 
8062211 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Frere Crim. Complaint ]; see, e.g., Student Consulting 
Group Complaint, supra note 88, at 9; Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, at 11–13 (alleging that 
after defendant took over borrowers’ accounts, borrowers stopped getting emails from their loan 
servicers while the company debited borrowers’ bank accounts for bogus relief). 
192. See Frere Crim. Complaint, supra note 191, at 2 (charging Brandon Frere for committing 
wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343); DOJ Press Release, supra note 16 (reporting that Mr. Frere 
pled guilty to charges of wire fraud and money laundering); infra notes 369–387 and accompanying text 
(discussing a federal proposed law that would impose criminal liability on relief scammers). 
193. See Frere Crim. Complaint, supra note 191, at 12. 
194. See id. at 6 (alleging that “from at least 2014 through November 2018, FRERE used the 
Companies to operate a debt relief enterprise”); see also infra notes 215–245 and accompanying text 
(explaining the negative consequences, including accrual of interest, while a loan is in forbearance). 
195. See Frere Crim. Complaint, supra note 191 at 9. 
196. See, e.g., FTC’s Operation Game of Loans, supra note 59.  
197. For an analysis of a federal bill aimed at stopping relief scams, see infra notes 366–428 and 
accompanying text. 
198. See infra notes 202–241 and accompanying text. 
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since 2017, has taken actions that are harmful to borrowers.199 Third, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), also under new leadership, has implemented 
several harmful changes, including shuttering the only office dedicated to fulfilling 
several statutorily mandated duties that protect student loan borrowers.200  
A. Borrowers Are Vulnerable to Relief Scams as Long as Loan Servicers Are Not  
Held Accountable  
In theory, borrowers can obtain, for free, debt management assistance from 
their loan servicers;201 however, investigations by federal and state authorities 
credibly accuse loan servicers of engaging in widespread unlawful practices.202 One 
could write a book about these practices, but only a brief summary of them is 
provided below.  
For several years, borrowers have submitted tens of thousands of complaints 
about loan servicers to the CFPB and state attorneys general.203 Borrower 
complaints include loan servicers incorrectly processing borrowers’ payments and 
steering borrowers into forbearance periods instead of into appropriate  
repayment plans.204  
 
199. See infra notes 245–289 and accompanying text. 
200. See infra notes 296–332 and accompanying text. 
201. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-663, FEDERAL STUDENT  
LOANS: EDUCATION COULD DO MORE TO HELP ENSURE BORROWERS ARE AWARE OF 
REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS OPTIONS (2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672136.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GW44-VVC7]. 
202. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF 
PUBLIC INPUT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 12–13 (2015), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YVC3-GXR2]. 
203. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT 
LOAN OMBUDSMAN 2 (2017) [hereinafter CFPB ANNUAL REPORT ], http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_annual-report_student-loan-ombudsman_2017.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/F4ZA-UPSB] (reporting that, as of August 31, 2017, the CPFB had received 50,700 
complaints from student loan borrowers about loan servicers). 
204. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MID-YEAR UPDATE ON STUDENT LOAN 
COMPLAINTS 3 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201506_cfpb_mid-year-update-on-
student-loan-complaints.pdf [https://perma.cc/44XQ-V35M]; CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU, STAYING ON TRACK WHILE GIVING BACK: THE COST OF STUDENT LOAN SERVICING 
BREAKDOWNS FOR PEOPLE SERVING THEIR COMMUNITIES 18 (2017) [hereinafter STAYING ON 
TRACK ], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_PSLF-midyear-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CSZ7-6UM7]. From 2014 to 2017, borrower complaints about servicers have been 
received, tracked, and summarized in an annual report published by the CFPB’s student loan 
ombudsman. See, e.g., CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 203, at 20 (“Since 2012, the Bureau has 
repeatedly documented how private student loan borrowers complain that their repayment efforts are 
sidelined due to servicing errors.”). Pursuant to its authority, the CFPB designated “a Private Education 
Loan Ombudsman” to assist consumers with private student loans and to prepare annual reports 
addressing complaints and other student lending issues. 12 U.S.C. § 5535(a), (c), (d) (2012). The CFPB’s 
Ombudsman is statutorily obligated to assist borrowers in resolving complaints with their loan  
servicers. Id. 
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While several loan servicers have been sued for unlawful practices,205 Navient 
Solutions, Inc. (Navient), formerly known as Sallie Mae, is highlighted below 
because it is the largest loan servicer,206 and its alleged unlawful practices are 
industry-wide.207 After receiving thousands of complaints and conducting a  
three-year investigation of student loan servicing practices,208 the CFPB filed in 
2017 an enforcement action against Navient for engaging in numerous practices 
alleged to be unfair, deceptive, and abusive.209 Moreover, the state attorneys general 
from California, Illinois, Mississippi, Washington, and Pennsylvania also filed 
lawsuits against Navient and its debt-collection subsidiaries (collectively, Navient) 
for violating state and federal consumer protection laws.210 Similarly, Navient’s 
investors filed a class-action lawsuit against the company claiming that it misled 
 
205. In a pending lawsuit filed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts against the 
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), the second largest loan servicing 
company, the Commonwealth alleged that PHEAA violated the federal Consumer Financial Protection 
Act as well state law by engaging in several unlawful payment processing practices against Massachusetts 
student loan borrowers. See Massachusetts v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency,  
No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL 1137520, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018) (finding that 
PHEAA, also known as FedLoan Servicing, had “not met its difficult and heavy burden of proving 
that its alleged misconduct is affirmatively authorized by federal law” and, therefore, denying PHEAA’s 
motion to dismiss). In 2019, New York Attorney General Letitia James announced a settlement of a 
lawsuit filed against ACS Education Services, now Conduent Education Services, for allegedly steering 
borrowers’ student loans into forbearance or deferment, instead of in appropriate repayment plans. See 
Steven Harras, N.Y. Regulators Order Student Loan Servicer to Pay $9M over Loan Practices, CQ ROLL 
CALL WASH. BANKING BRIEFING, Jan. 8, 2019. 
206. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23 (stating that “Navient 
services the loans of more than 12 million borrowers, including over 6 million customer accounts under 
a contract with the U.S. Department of Education, and more than $300 billion in federal and private 
student loan”). 
207. See, e.g., Memorandum at 6, Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc. v. Navient Corp., 363  
F. Supp. 3d, 476 (D. Del. 2019) (No. 16–112-GMS) (alleging in investors’ lawsuit that “Navient engaged 
in a widespread and continual practice of concealing from investors” alleged unlawful practices related 
to the servicing of private student loans); Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violation of 
the Fed. Secs. Laws at 84, In re Navient Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 17-8373 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2019) (citing to 
several negative media reports about Navient and alleging that its “pervasive practice of placing 
borrowers into forbearance materially impacted its financial results”). 
208. Under the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the CFPB has investigatory powers. See 12 
U.S.C. § 5562 (2019). 
209. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23. The CFPB has both 
supervisory and enforcement authority over student loan servicers. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1090.100, 1090.102, 
1090.106 (2014). 
210. Complaint, Washinton v. Navient Corp., No. 17-2-01115-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 
2017) [hereinafter Wash. v. Navient Complaint ]; Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other 
Relief, Commonwealth v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-01814-RDM (M.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2017) [hereinafter  
Penn. v. Navient Complaint ]; Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Penalties, Restitution, and 
Other Equitable Relief, California v. Navient Corp., No. CGC-18-567732, 2018 WL 3199474  
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 29, 2018) [hereinafter Cal. v. Navient Complaint ]; Mississippi v. Navient Corp., 
No. 25CH1:18-cv-00982 (Miss. Ch. Ct. July 17, 2018) [hereinafter Miss. v. Navient Complaint]; Illinois 
v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23. State attorneys general have the authority to enforce the federal 
consumer protection laws that unfair, deceptive and abusive acts and practices. See 12  
U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1). 
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investors regarding various investigations indicating that Navient had engaged in 
several unlawful loan servicing practices.211  
Chief among the allegations is that Navient incentivized its employees to 
intentionally steer borrowers into forbearance periods instead of enrolling them into 
several legitimate loan repayment programs available to borrowers with federal 
student loans.212 From at least five years, the CFPB alleged that Navient enrolled 
over 1.5 million borrowers’ loans into consecutive forbearances of two or more 
periods for twelve or more months.213 Because the loans continued to accrue 
interest while in forbearance, the CFPB alleged that this forbearance scheme 
resulted in the accrual of nearly four billion dollars in interest.214  
Navient benefitted from the accrued interest, but it was harmful to 
borrowers.215 If, for example, a borrower with a $30,000 federal loan spent three 
years in forbearance, that borrower would have to pay $6,742 more than a borrower 
with a standard ten-year repayment plan whose loan was never put in forbearance.216 
The four billion dollars in accrued interest could have been avoided, perhaps 
entirely, if Navient had enrolled borrowers into income-based repayment plans that 
were appropriate for their situations.217  
Navient’s alleged forbearance practice also prevented borrowers from 
benefiting from an interest subsidy.218 Borrowers that have a subsidized federal loan 
and that are enrolled in an income-driven repayment plan qualify to have the 
government pay accrued interest not covered by their monthly payments for up to 
three years of consecutive enrollment.219 Because that accrued interest is paid in full 
by the federal government, it is not added to the principal balance of the loan.220 
Depending on the borrower’s principal balance, this interest subsidy could amount 
 
211. See Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc. v. Navient Corp., 363 F. Supp. 3d 476  
(D. Del. 2019); In re Navient Corp. Secs. Litig., No. 1:17-cv-08373, 2019 WL 7288881, at 4  
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2019) (denying Navient’s motion to dismiss a proposed investor class-action suit and 
finding that the plaintiffs had pled facts showing that Navient and its top executives concealed negative 
information, including that a FSA audit revealed Navient’s failure to comply with servicing standards). 
212. See Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc., 363 F. Supp. at 492–93 (describing the testimony of 
confidential witnesses who indicated that supervisors were directly involved in a widespread practice 
of awarding bonuses to incentivize “low-level” employees to put borrowers into forbearance); 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 17–22 (explaining how employees 
were incentivized to limit customer calls to just under six minutes and, thereby, put borrowers loans 
into forbearance); Illinois v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 36; Cal. v. Navient Complaint, supra 
note 210, at 13. 
213. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 20–23. 
214. Id. at 23. 
215. Id. at 23. 
216. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-163, FEDERAL STUDENT  
LOANS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF SCHOOLS’ DEFAULT RATES, at  
Highlights (2018). 
217. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 23. 
218. Id. at 24–25. 
219. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(iii) (2018). 
220. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 13. 
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to savings in the thousands of dollars.221 Thus, Navient’s alleged forbearance 
scheme deprived borrowers of the benefit of having their accrued interest paid for 
while enrolled in income-driven repayment plans.222  
Moreover, Navient’s alleged forbearance practice prevented borrowers from 
qualifying for loan forgiveness programs.223 When a borrower’s loan is put into 
forbearance, instead of into an income-based repayment plan, the borrower is not 
making any payments and, therefore, cannot satisfy the mandatory payment 
requirements to obtain loan forgiveness.224 As a result, to satisfy the relevant period 
to obtain forgiveness, the borrower who spent three years in forbearance (described 
in the example above), would not only owe $6,742 in added interest on the $30,000 
loan balance but would also have to spend three more years making payments in a 
qualified payment plan.225  
In addition to alleged unlawful forbearances, Navient and other loan servicers 
have been accused of rampant unlawful payment processing practices that misapply 
and misallocate borrowers’ payments,226 thereby causing borrowers to suffer 
financial harm.227 For instance, borrowers accused Navient of misallocating 
borrowers’ payments, meaning that Navient allegedly ignored borrowers’ 
instructions, which were often given in writing, and allocated payments in an 
arbitrary, unfair, and often illogical manner.228 For example, in the lawsuit filed by 
 
221. Id. at 23. 
222. Id. 
223. Borrowers enrolled in an income-based or income-driven plan can obtain: (1) loan 
forgiveness after 20 to 25 years of qualifying payments in an income-driven repayment plan, or (2) loan 
forgiveness after 10 years of qualifying payments as a public servant enrolled in the federal Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program. Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d 529, 536 
(M.D. Pa. 2018); see infra notes 233–241 and accompanying text (describing obstacles allegedly put in 
place by loan servicers to prevent most borrowers from obtaining forgiveness through the  
PSLF program). 
224. Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 537. 
225. Id. at 537 (denying Navient’s motion to dismiss and finding that Pennsylvania had 
sufficiently alleged that Navient unlawfully steered borrowers into forbearance, the consequences of 
which included “addition of interest to the principal [of a borrower’s loan] and lost months that would 
have otherwise counted toward forgiveness”). 
226. See, e.g., Illinois v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 54; Wash. v. Navient Complaint, 
supra note 210, at 27–29. According to the CFPB, Navient’s processing failures occurred for multiple 
reasons, including that it “(1) did not disclose its payment allocation methodology, (2) failed to read 
borrowers’ allocation and application instructions, and (3) failed to implement borrowers’ instructions 
properly.” See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-00101, 2017 WL 3380530, 
at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (denying Navient’s motion to dismiss); Massachusetts v. Pa. Higher  
Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL 1137520, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 
2018) (denying PHEAA’s motion to dismiss and noting that PHEAA had failed to cite any federal law 
that permits it to misapply and misallocate payments). 
227. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 539 (denying Navient’s motion 
to dismiss and summarizing Pennsylvania’s allegations that Navient’s payment processing errors “have 
resulted in: (1) borrowers and cosigners incurring improper late fees and increased interest charges, and 
(2) the furnishing of inaccurate negative information to consumer reporting agencies”). 
228. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23; Illinois v. Navient 
Complaint, supra note 23, at 12; Wash. v. Navient Complaint, supra note 210, at 27–29. 
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the State of Washington, one borrower stated that she had set up payments to be 
deducted automatically from her bank account and allocated among six loans, but 
Navient allocated payments on only five of the six loans.229 This allocation method 
caused the borrower to be treated as delinquent on the sixth loan even though that 
was incorrect due to Navient’s misallocation.230  
Besides being harmed by loan servicers’ alleged unlawful allocation practices, 
borrowers have encountered significant hurdles when applying for and attempting 
to obtain loan forgiveness through the federal Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
(PSLF) program.231 The program will forgive a borrower’s balance after ten years 
of eligible payments if the borrower was employed full-time by an eligible 
governmental or nonprofit entity.232 The PSLF program was created by Congress 
in 2007 to grant borrowers with public service jobs relief from student loan debt in 
exchange for a decade of payments and employment in public service.233 Both 
Navient as well as the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 
(PHEAA), well-known as FedLoan Servicing and the administrator of the PSLF 
program, have been sued for allegedly preventing and hindering borrowers’ ability 
to enroll in the PSLF program and to maintain eligibility for it.234  
Disturbing data exists regarding the lack of success in borrowers obtaining 
loan forgiveness through the PSLF program.235 The first date that borrowers could 
have actually received loan forgiveness through the PSLF program was October 1, 
2017.236 In 2018, the Education Department finally admitted that less than one percent 
of borrowers whose PSLF applications were processed received loan forgiveness.237 
Specifically, only ninety-six out of roughly 28,000 borrowers who had enrolled were 
actually granted loan forgiveness under the program in 2017.238 Of the ninety-nine 
percent who were rejected, the Education Department claims that the majority did 
not meet eligibility criteria and that it rejected twenty-eight percent due to 
incomplete applications.239 Moreover, despite there being nearly thirty-three million 
 
229. Wash. v. Navient Complaint, supra note 210, at 28. 
230. See id. (alleging that this misallocation of payments happened several times and that Navient 
made repeated collection calls to borrower and her co-signor). 
231. See infra notes 236–242 and accompanying text; STAYING ON TRACK, supra note 204, at 4, 
27–43 (stating that loan servicers have engaged in practices that “delay, defer, or deny access to” the 
PSLF program and detailing complaints from borrowers). 
232. STAYING ON TRACK, supra note 204, at 21. 
233. See Crespi, supra note 89, at 823–24.  
234. See, e.g., Complaint, New York v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 19-cv-9155, 
2019 WL 5095707 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 3, 2019); Complaint, Morris v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 
No. 2:18-cv-00031-CDJ, 2018 WL 345341 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Morris Complaint ] 
(“PHEAA was . . . the second most complained about loan servicer in April 2017.”). 
235. See infra notes 236–242 and accompanying text. 
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borrowers who could be eligible for the PSLF program as of 2018, only 900,000 of 
those individuals were successful in verifying their employment at a public service 
organization.240 The lawsuits against Navient and FedLoan alleged that their unfair 
and deceptive practices prevented borrowers from completing applications to enroll 
in the PSLF program and to maintain their participation in it.241  
Because loan servicers make money based, in part, on the amount of the 
outstanding loans, lawsuits alleged that loan servicers had no incentive to actually 
help borrowers achieve loan forgiveness.242  
Unfortunately for borrowers, President Trump’s election and his controversial 
appointment of Betsy DeVos as the Education Secretary emboldened loan servicers 
to request that she “reduce unnecessary and burdensome requirements.”243 As 
discussed in the next section, Secretary DeVos has acted to shield loan servicers 
from accountability244 and has, thereby, left borrowers more likely to be receptive 
to debt relief scams.  
B. Under New Leadership, the Education Department Has Abandoned Borrowers  
Since Secretary DeVos’s tie-breaking confirmation as head of the Education 
Department,245 she has been sued by numerous class-action litigants and state 
attorneys general for taking numerous actions considered harmful, including 
continuing to unlawfully garnish the wages of certain student loan borrowers during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.246 However, only a few relevant actions are discussed 
 
240. Press Release, Student Borrower Prot. Ctr., AFT and SBPC Launch Joint Investigation 
into Mismanagement and Industry Abuses in Federal Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program  
(Dec. 20, 2018), https://protectborrowers.org/aft-and-sbpc-launch-joint-investigation-into-
mismanagement-and-industry-abuses-in-federal-public-service-loan-forgiveness-program/ [https:// 
perma.cc/BWH4-26KG]. 
241. See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 43; 
Massachusetts v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL 1137520, at 
*9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018). 
242. See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 43; Morris 
Complaint, supra note 234, at 2 (“[H]elping borrowers get out of debt sooner directly conflicted with 
FedLoan’s own financial interest in keeping loans active for as long as possible to continue collecting 
monthly servicing fees.”). 
243. See Paul Davidson, Student Loan Guidelines Changed Again: Education Chief Halts  
Obama-era Overhaul of Collection Process, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2017, at B2. 
244. See, e.g., Deirdre Fernandes, State AGs Spar with DeVos on Loan Debt: Healey Says 
Secretary Sides with Collectors Over Students, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2018, at A1. 
245. Brown, supra note 98.  
246. See, e.g., supra note 44 and accompanying text (mentioning the class-action lawsuit filed 
against Secretary DeVos for allegedly violating the CARES Act by, among other things, garnishing the 
paychecks of borrowers with qualifying federal student loans during the COVID-19 pandemic and 
unlawfully intercepting their tax refunds); Borrowers Are Still Having Their Paychecks Seized over 
Defaulted Student Loans, Even Though the CARES Act Was Supposed to Stop Wage Garnishment, 
Lawsuit Says, FINANCIALPRESS (Aug. 8, 2020), https://financialpress.com/staging/2020/08/08/ 
borrowers-are-still-having-their-paychecks-seized-over-defaulted-student-loans-even-though-the-cares- 
act-was-supposed-to-stop-wage-garnishment-lawsuit-says/ [https://perma.cc/M3WQ-AKCU] 
(summarizing the status of a class-action lawsuit where plaintiffs allege that Secretary DeVos and the 
Education Department have unlawfully garnished the paychecks of almost 2,900 borrowers four 
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below to demonstrate that Secretary DeVos’s actions have financially harmed 
student loan borrowers.247 
Over two years ago, Secretary DeVos made several announcements that 
purported to at first delay, and ultimately prevent, a regulation commonly referred 
to as the Borrower Defense Rule (BDR) from going into effect.248 The BDR was 
adopted in 2016, after the collapse of for-profit Corinthian Colleges.249 The BDR 
was created to establish a process through which borrowers could apply for 
discharge of their student loan debts incurred to attend for-profit schools that had 
misrepresented their post-graduation rates of employment. 250 After attorneys 
general from nineteen states and the District of Columbia sued Secretary DeVos, a 
federal court ruled in late 2018 that her decision to delay the rule was arbitrary and 
capricious and, therefore, not lawful.251 
While this 2018 court ruling signaled victory, borrowers relying on the BDR 
to obtain a debt discharge are still waiting.252 As of March 2019, over 140,000 
applications submitted to the Education Department by borrowers were still 
pending.253 In June 2019, nearly 160,000 former students of for-profit colleges sued 
Secretary DeVos for failing to process their BDR applications.254 Thereafter, 
 
months into the pandemic and are unlawfully holding onto the tax refunds of up 22,000 borrowers); see 
also Steph Solis, Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey Has at Least 43 Lawsuits Against the 
Trump Administration, MASS LIVE ( June 6, 2019) (describing numerous lawsuits filed by Massachusetts 
Attorney General Maura Healey against President Trump and Trump-appointed heads of agencies, 
including Secretary DeVos).  
247. See id.; ETHAN LUTZ, MIKE LITT & ED MIERZWINSKI, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, 
POSITIONED TO PROTECT: HOW STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES CAN FILL THE CFPB VOID 
(2018) [hereinafter PIRG REPORT ], https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/positionedto 
protect_Word_finalwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R7Y-ATAV] (describing several multi-state 
lawsuits filed by attorneys general against Secretary DeVos and explaining how states can take action 
to protect consumers); see also Complaint at 24, Maryland v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:17-cv-02139 
(D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/news%20documents/
Complaint_Gainful_Employment.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KKQ-W3WK] (noting allegations by the 
attorneys general of seventeen states and the District of Columbia that Secretary DeVos’s “illegal delays 
and refusal to enforce [a 2014 regulation known as the Gainful Employment] Rule harm current and 
prospective students”). 
248. See ALAN ZIBEL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, UNIVERSITY OF GREED 31–33 (Rick Claypool, Julie 
Murray & Robert Weissman eds., 2018), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration/
university-of-greed-public-citizen-education-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5MR-8XPP]. 
249. See Bauer v. DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74, 80–81 (D.D.C. 2018). 
250. Id. at 82. 
251. Id. at 110 (granting summary judgment in favor of the state plaintiffs and in favor of two 
student borrowers). 
252. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, “Don’t You Have a Heart?”: Senate Democrats Press DeVos 
on Backlog of 140,000 Student Debt-Relief Claims, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2019 (explaining the “backlog 
of claims from defrauded student-loan borrowers”).  
253. Id. During her congressional testimony, Secretary DeVos stated that she “believed” 
applications were approved but did not provide any data to back up her belief. Id. 
254. See Press Release, The Project on Predatory Student Lending, Legal Srvs. Ctr. of Harvard 
L. Sch., For-Profit College Students File Lawsuit to Force Betsy DeVos to Follow the Law and Cancel 
their Student Loan Debt ( June 25, 2019), https://predatorystudentlending.org/news/press-releases/
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Secretary DeVos and the Education Department were both held in contempt and 
ordered to pay a $100,000 fine for repeatedly defying (16,000 times) an injunction 
prohibiting them from collecting loan payments from student borrowers defrauded 
by Corinthian Colleges.255 In April 2020, Secretary DeVos, without admitting 
wrongdoing, settled a class-action lawsuit by agreeing to issue final decisions on 
dischargeability in nearly 170,000 BDR applications within eighteen months and to 
cancel debt for approved applicants within twenty-one months.256  
Bent on limiting future borrowers’ ability to discharge debt incurred at  
for-profit schools, Secretary DeVos proposed the “Institutional Accountability” 
(IA) regulation, which replaces the BDR, imposes on borrowers a substantial 
burden of proof, and thereby severely limits debt dischargeability.257 Congress, in a 
bipartisan vote, passed legislation to block DeVos’s IA regulation from taking 
effect, but in May 2020, President Trump vetoed Congress’s attempt to block this 
new rule, thereby angering several constituents, including veterans seeking 




255. Calvillo Manriquez v. DeVos, 411 F. Supp. 3d 535, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Magistrate Judge 
Sallie Kim stated, “Given that there are over 16,000 borrowers who have suffered damages from 
Defendants’ violation of the preliminary injunction and given that there may be some administrative 
expenses to remedy the harm, the Court finds the amount [of $100,000] reasonable.” Id. The magistrate 
judge had previously granted the injunction after 110,000 student loan borrowers filed a class-action 
suit seeking relief from the Education Department’s debt collection. See id. at 537–39. The judge agreed 
with the borrowers that the Education Department had unlawfully limited loan forgiveness to them by 
determining forgiveness eligibility using nonpublic earnings data from Social Security Administration, 
in violation of federal privacy law. See id. 
256. See Settlement Agreement at 5–7, Sweet v. DeVos, No. 3:19-cv-03674-WHA  
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020, https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
DeVosBorrowerDefense-SETTLEMENT.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GGJ-GKH7]. 
257. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.206 (2019) (discharging student debt requires proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, “that an institution at which the borrower enrolled made a 
representation with knowledge that the representation was false, or with reckless disregard for the 
truth”); Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William 
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 49788 (Sept. 23, 2019) (requiring a borrower 
seeking to discharge student loan debt to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that an institution 
at which the borrower enrolled made a representation with knowledge that the representation was false, 
or with reckless disregard for the truth”); Laura Camera, Senate Rebukes Betsy DeVos, Trump 
Administration in Vote on Student Debt Relief Rule, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 11, 2020 
(reporting that DeVos believed the BDR rule was “too lenient” and that she made it a high priority to 
rewrite the rule to limit relief to student loan borrowers). 
258. See Camera, supra note 257 (reporting that DeVos’s proposed rule was viewed as “too 
extreme” for both Republicans and Democrats). Adam S. Minsky, Veterans’ and Consumer Groups 
“Heartbroken” After Trump Vetoes Student Loan Relief Bill, FORBES (May 30, 2020, 9:44 AM),  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamminsky/2020/05/30/veterans-and-consumer-groups-heartbroken-
after-trump-vetoes-student-loan-relief-bill/#654546e77ecf [https://perma.cc/8F97-PRGL] 
(reporting that current military members and veterans are frequently targeted by for-profit schools, 
which have much higher rates of defaults for borrowers with federal student loans); Press Release, 
Michael Rose, Nat’l Ass’n for Coll. Admission Counseling, NACAC Expresses Disappointment Over 
Presidential Veto of Borrower Defense Resolution ( June 2, 2020), https://www.nacacnet.org/news--
publications/newsroom/press-releases/borrower_defense/ [https://perma.cc/L68L-7AXS] (stating 
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By implementing her new rule to substantially limit debt dischargeability, 
Secretary DeVos demonstrates that she has sided with for-profit schools.259 Recall 
that a previously discussed relief company actually targeted borrowers who had 
incurred debt to attend for-profit schools.260 By arbitrarily and capriciously taking 
actions to prevent borrowers from discharging debts via the BDR application 
process, Secretary DeVos has prevented borrowers from receiving millions of 
dollars in legitimate debt relief.261 Secretary DeVos’s actions are not surprising based 
on her comment that the Obama-era BDR process allowed borrowers to “raise 
[their] hand” to get “free money.”262  
Not only has Secretary DeVos taken actions that hinder borrowers seeking a 
debt discharge under the BDR, but she has also taken actions to prevent federal 
authorities from holding loan servicers accountable for alleged unlawful practices 
harmful to borrowers.263 For instance, in 2017, the Education Department canceled 
plans previously announced under President Obama’s administration to develop 
and impose on loan servicers a set of servicing standards that would afford 
borrowers greater protections.264 Moreover, the Education Department terminated 
 
that Secretary DeVos’s new “rule makes it difficult for students who were defrauded by certain colleges 
or universities to have their federal student loans forgiven, leaving them with significant debts and little 
to no means to repay them”). 
259. Furthering her alliance with the for-profit industry, DeVos appointed Julian Schmoke to 
head the Student Aid Enforcement Unit, which was founded during the Obama administration to 
“more aggressively combat fraud and deceptive practices at colleges and universities.” Michael 
Stratford, Trump Administration Selects Former DeVry Official to Lead College Enforcement Unit, 
POLITICO (Aug. 30, 2017, 4:13 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/30/julian-schmoke-
jr-trump-education-department-college-enforcement-242176 [https://perma.cc/F8SN-XKMQ] 
(reporting on the hiring of a former dean at DeVry University and potential conflicts of interest due to 
DeVry’s agreement to pay $100 million to settle allegations of deceptive practices made during the 
Obama Administration); Valerie Strauss, Students Gouged By For-Profit Schools Could Soon Be Out of 
Luck, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2017/10/31/students-gouged-by-for-profit-schools-could-soon-be-out-of-luck-thanks-to-
betsy-devos/ [https://perma.cc/8P6T-YWYH] (reporting that the Student Aid Enforcement Unit has 
ceased investigating for-profit schools suspected of unfair and deceptive practices); see also Cory Turner, 
Students Call College That Got Millions in Coronavirus Relief “A Sham,” NPR (May 12, 2020, 11:20AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/08/851629409/students-call-college-that-got-millions-in-coronavirus- 
relief-a-sham [https://perma.cc/P42K-3JEX] (demonstrating how Secretary DeVos, during the 2020 
pandemic, has made it possible for a for-profit college to obtain $17 million in federal assistance under 
the CARES Act, up to half of which can be spent however the institution wishes). 
260. See supra notes 150–154 and accompanying text (discussing the FTC enforcement action 
filed against Alliance Document Preparation). 
261. See Bauer v. DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74, 82 (D.D.C. 2018). 
262. Andrew Kreighhbaum, DeVos: Borrower-Defense Rule Offered “Free Money,” INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/09/26/devos-
borrower-defense-rule-offered-%E2%80%98free-money%E2%80%99 [https://perma.cc/ 
UPN7-ZQEE]. 
263. See ZIBEL, supra note 248, at 34–39. 
264. See John L. Culhane, Jr., State AGs Criticize ED Withdrawal of Obama Student Loan 
Servicing Policy Direction, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Apr. 26, 2017), https://
www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2017/04/26/state-ags-criticize-ed-withdrawal-of-obama-student- 
loan-servicing-policy-direction/ [https://perma.cc/78EY-VTUX]. 
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its “memoranda of understanding,” which permitted it to share student loan 
information with the CFPB, which in turn allowed the CFPB to investigate loan 
servicers for potentially unlawful behavior.265 Since 2017, the Education 
Department has refused to share student loan information with the CFPB.266 
Secretary DeVos then issued to student loan servicers guidance stating that federal 
student loans were covered by federal privacy law.267 Based on this guidance, loan 
servicers have refused to produce any student loan information requested by the 
CFPB.268 As a result of these actions, Secretary Devos has weakened the CFPB’s 
ability to investigate loan servicers for unlawful, unfair, abusive, or  
deceptive practices.269 
Secretary DeVos’s decision to withhold information also impacts state 
enforcement authorities in pending lawsuits.270 Prior to her appointment, the 
Education Department shared student loan information with state authorities.271 
Recall that in addition to the CFPB, attorneys general from several states sued loan 
servicers for violating state consumer protection laws, which prohibit unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices.272 In a 2019 letter to Secretary DeVos, attorneys 
general from twenty-one jurisdictions requested that she reverse her position,273 but 
she has refused to do so.274 
Besides refusing to disclose student loan information under the guise of 
privacy concerns, Secretary DeVos has not taken any steps recommended by the 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to hold loan servicers accountable.275 Within 
 
265. See Department of Education Terminates Student Loan Sharing Agreements with CFPB, 
Announces Expanded Focus on Enforcement and Consumer Protection, BUCKLEY: INFOBYTES BLOG 
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://buckleyfirm.com/blog/2017-09-08/department-education-terminates-
student-loan-sharing-agreements-cfpb-announces-expanded-focus-enforcement-and-consumer-protection 
[https://perma.cc/6ZJH-7W54]; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Attorneys General Say Trump 
Administration Is Withholding Critical Student Loan Information, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2019, 3:58 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/04/05/attorneys-general-say-trump-administration- 
is-withholding-critical-student-loan-information/ [https://perma.cc/5BCP-C2XT].  
266. Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 265. 
267. See id.; Letters from Att’ys Gen. to Betsy DeVos, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://ncdoj.gov/Files/News/Final-AG-Letter-to-ED-4-14-19.aspx [https://perma.cc/DP3N-
3Z6E] [hereinafter Letters from AGs] (Attorneys General of California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Virginia, and Washington). 
268. See supra notes 266–267. 
269. See ZIBEL, supra note 248, at 37. 
270. See id. 
271. Id. 
272. See supra notes 202–241 and accompanying text. 
273. See Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 265. 
274. Id. (contending that Secretary DeVos has taken “a significant step away from the interests 
of consumers and toward” loan servicers who seek to use the Privacy Act as a shield as they resist being 
held accountable for their actions). 
275. See Protecting Student Borrowers: Loan Servicing Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Dep’ts of Lab., Health and Hum. Servs. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(statement of Bryon Gordon, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Department of Education, Office 
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the Education Department, the Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) has regulatory 
oversight over loan servicers.276 But in 2019, the OIG reported that based on its 
audit of FSA’s internal reports about loan servicers, sixty-one percent of 343 internal 
reports revealed noncompliances by loan servicers.277 The two major 
noncompliances were loan servicers failing to inform borrowers of available 
repayment options and loan servicers incorrectly calculating income-driven 
payment amounts for borrowers to pay.278 The OIG report concluded that FSA 
rarely used its authority to hold servicers accountable for instances of 
noncompliance.279 Consequently, “FSA did not provide servicers with an incentive 
to take actions to mitigate the risk of continued servicer noncompliance that could 
harm students.”280 
The OIG’s scathing findings came after Secretary DeVos took actions to 
impede current litigation by state enforcement authorities against loan servicers.281 
In 2018, Secretary DeVos issued a Notice of Interpretation (Preemption 
Interpretation) in which she claimed state consumer protection laws are preempted 
by the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA).282 A careful reading of DeVos’s 
Preemption Interpretation reveals that it lacks substantive legal arguments.283 That 
is because DeVos’s Preemption Interpretation failed to cite to any specific HEA 
provisions or regulations that were purportedly in conflict with long-standing state 
consumer protection laws to justify her preemption assertion.284  
While the loan servicing industry applauded Secretary DeVos’s Preemption 
Interpretation, a bipartisan group of state attorneys general and a group of state 
governors sent letters urging Secretary DeVos to allow them to defend their 
student-residents against unlawful practices by the industry.285 Most importantly, 
 
of Inspector General), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP07/20190306/109005/HHRG-116-
AP07-Bio-GordonB-20190306.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4DW-HK63]. The OIG is an independent 
audit and investigative unit within the Education Department. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 21, at 2. 
278. Id. at 10. 
279. See id. 
280. Id. at 2. 
281. See Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal 
Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619 (Mar. 12, 2018). 
282. Id. 
283. See Letter from AGs, supra note 267 (explaining why the AGs believe Secretary DeVos’ 
preemption assertion is not grounded in law). 
284. In a lawsuit filed by the student loan servicing industry against the District of Columbia, 
the court rejected the industry’s contention that Secretary DeVos’ Preemption Interpretation should be 
given legal weight. See Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 51 
(D.D.C. 2018) (explaining that it “lacks requisite thoroughness and persuasiveness because it fails to 
specify the regulations that it is interpreting . . . . Thus, the Court gives no deference to [it] . . . .”). 
285. See Letter from Eric Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Douglas S. Chin, Haw. Att’y Gen., 
Xavier Becerra, Cal. Att’y Gen., Stephen H. Levins, Exec. Dir., Haw. Off. of Consumer Prot., Cynthia 
H. Coffman, Colo. Att’y Gen., Lisa Madigan, Ill. Att’y Gen., George Jepsen, Conn. Att’y Gen., Curtis 
Hill, Ind. Att’y Gen., Matthew P. Denn, Del. Att’y Gen., Tom Miller, Iowa Att’y Gen., Karl A. Racine, 
D.C. Att’y Gen., Derek Schmidt, Kan. Att’y Gen., Andy Beshear, Ky. Att’y Gen., Josh Stein, N.C. Att’y 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a well-reasoned 
opinion, held that the HEA does not preempt state law claims based on alleged 
misrepresentations by the loan servicer.286 Therefore, loan servicers will not be 
successful in relying on DeVos’s Preemption Interpretation to avoid liability under 
state consumer protection laws.287  
The point in raising the preemption issue is to demonstrate that by continuing 
to side with the loan servicing industry and failing to exercise oversight over the 
industry, Secretary DeVos allows loan servicers to persist in perpetrating alleged 
unlawful practices while simultaneously making millions in profits off the backs of 
borrowers.288 Moreover, the Education Department is continuing to foster an 
environment where some borrowers will be receptive to ads by relief companies,289 
 
Gen., Maura Healey, Mass. Att’y Gen., Ellen F. Rosenblum, Or. Att’y Gen., Janet T. Mills, Me. Att’y 
Gen., Peter F. Kilmartin, R.I. Att’y Gen., Brian E. Frosh, Md. Att’y Gen., Herbert H. Slatery, III,  
Tenn. Att’y Gen., Lori Swanson, Minn. Att’y Gen., Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen., Timothy C. Fox, 
Mont. Att’y Gen., Mark R. Herring, Va. Att’y Gen., T. J. Donovan, Vt. Att’y Gen., Bob Ferguson, 
Wash. Att’y Gen., to Betsy DeVos, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Oct. 23, 2017), http://
www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2017_10/The-Honorable_Betsy_DeVos.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3YJM-H8VY] (including the signatures of Republican Attorneys General from Texas, 
Indiana, and Tennessee); Press Release, Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Governors Voice Concerns Over New 
Student Borrower Proposal (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.nga.org/news/press-releases/governors-
voice-concerns-over-new-student-borrower-proposal [https://perma.cc/RX3W-GFCS]; see also Letter 
from John Ryan, President & CEO, Conf. of State Bank Supervisors, to Betsy De Vos, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:6OVfj8XD 
ZKkJ:https://www.csbs.org/csbs-opposes-department-education-plan-preempt-state-authority-student- 
loans+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us [https://perma.cc/9M87-XV85]. 
286. The Court held that there was no conflict between the HEA’s lending-disclosure 
requirements and state consumer protection laws. Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., 928 F.3d 
639, 642 (7th. Cir. 2019) (“When a loan servicer holds itself out to a borrower as having experts who 
work for her, tells her that she does not need to look elsewhere for advice, and tells her that its experts 
know what options are in her best interest, those statements, when untrue, cannot be treated by courts 
as mere failures to disclose information [required under the HEA]. Those are affirmative 
misrepresentations, not failures to disclose. Great Lakes chose to make them. A borrower who 
reasonably relied on them to her detriment is not barred by § 1098g [of the HEA] from bringing  
state-law consumer protection . . . and tort claims against the loan servicer.”); see also Student Loan 
Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 51 (refusing to give deference to DeVos’s Preemption Interpretation 
“because it fail[ed] to specify the [HEA] regulations that it is interpreting”); Pennsylvania v. Navient 
Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the district court “correctly concluded that 
the Commonwealth’s complaint alleges Navient made numerous affirmative misrepresentations, and 
claims based thereon are not expressly preempted by the [Higher] Education Act”).  
287. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed an enforcement action against PHEAA, also 
known as FedLoan Servicing, alleging that it violated state consumer protection law. Massachusetts  
v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL 1137520, at *9  
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018). In that case, the Education Department filed a Statement of Interest 
that PHEAA relied on, to no avail, for a preemption argument. Id. at *9. 
288. See Letter from Eric Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen. et al., supra note 285. 
289. See, e.g., An Examination of State Efforts to Oversee the $1.5 Trillion Student Loan Servicing 
Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra 
note 24 (statement of Joe Sanders, Student Loan Ombudsman and Supervising Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Consumer Fraud Bureau, Illinois Att’y Gen.’s Office) (discussing Secretary DeVos’s termination of 
plans from President Obama’s administration to impose standards on servicing companies, stating that 
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such as National Student Loan Rescue, LLC.290 This company baited borrowers by 
claiming that it worked “specifically” with the loan servicer to lower their payments 
and claiming that it could rescue borrows from the collection practices of the 
legitimate servicing companies.291 Another group of defendants operating under the 
name “Premier Student Loan Center” baited borrowers by making robocalls 
containing messages highlighting some of Secretary DeVos’s failures.292  
In summary, the lawsuits against relief companies demonstrate how they 
exploit the gap left by loan servicers. If Secretary DeVos and the Education 
Department would exercise oversight to make loan servicers fulfill their contractual 
obligation to assist borrowers with loan repayment options,293 borrowers would 
have no need to seek relief elsewhere.  
C. The CFPB, Under New Leadership, Has Implemented Harmful Changes 
In addition to Secretary DeVos’s actions to shield loan servicers from 
accountability, new leadership at the CFPB implemented several changes deemed 
harmful to student loan borrowers.294 In November 2017, President Trump made 
another controversial move by appointing as the acting director of the CFPB, John 
“Mick” Mulvaney,295 who prior to his appointment, had been an outspoken critic 
of the CFPB and had once called it a “sick, sad joke.”296 During his thirteen months 
in the position, Mr. Mulvaney’s major changes include dismissing all members of 
 
“[s]ervicing failures . . . create more problems for student loan borrowers as predatory companies seek 
to fill the student loan servicing information void”). 
290. Id. at 1–3 (citing several lawsuits filed by Illinois Attorney General against relief companies, 
including National Student Loan Rescue). 
291. See, e.g., Complaint at 10, Illinois v. Nat’l Student Loan Rescue, Inc., No. 2016-CH-03196, 
2016 WL 1028957 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 2016) (alleging that that the company falsely claimed to “work[ ] 
specifically” with FedLoan Servicing, an actual loan servicer authorized by the Department  
of Education).  
292. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text; Complaint, Abramson v. Consumer  
Advoc. Ctr., Inc., No. AR-18-001258, 2018 WL 9537488 (Pa. Ct. C.P. July 13, 2018); Complaint, 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Consumer Advoc. Ctr., No. 8:19-cv-01998 JVS, 2019 WL 5721909  
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2019) (alleging defendants collected $71 million in advanced fees nationwide). 
293. See supra notes 289–293 and accompanying text.  
294. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–3, Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. Under L. v. U.S. Off. of  
Mgmt. & Budget, No. 1:19-CV-01149 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2019), https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/2019-04-22-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/H52S-7XCG] (describing 
how Mick Mulvaney’s reorganizing of the CFPB’s Office of Fair Lending and Opportunity stripped 
that office of its enforcement authority to protect consumers from discriminatory lending practices); 
see Preeti Varathan, Trump Says the CFPB Has “Devastated” Financial Institutions. The Numbers Tell a 
Different Story, QUARTZ (Nov. 28, 2017), https://qz.com/1139254/trump-says-the-cfpb-has-
devastated-financial-institutions-the-numbers-tell-a-different-story/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6A8E-DF6D]. 
295. See Patricia McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Structure of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2543, 2574–75 (2019) (describing the controversial aspects of  
Mr. Mulvaney’s appointment, including how he physically seized control of the CFPB’s premises and 
ousted then Deputy Director, Leandra English after the resignation of Richard Cordray, the first  
CFPB Director). 
296. Id. at 2574. 
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the statutorily created Consumer Advisory Board,297 dropping investigations into 
payday lenders,298 delaying a new payday lending regulation,299 and scaling back 
enforcement actions.300  
Mr. Mulvaney’s changes that directly impact student loan borrowers include 
his decision to jettison previously announced plans by Richard Cordray, the CFPB’s 
first director, to propose rules that would regulate student loan servicers.301 This 
decision, along with Secretory DeVos’s decisions to lessen regulatory “burdens” on 
loan servicers,302 means that borrowers cannot look to federal regulators to impose 
responsible servicing standards on loan servicers.  
Besides shelving proposed rulemaking, Mr. Mulvaney froze nearly all 
enforcement activities.303 While the FTC continues to be actively involved in 
pursuing fraudulent relief companies via its federal-state partnership (called 
Operation Game of Loans),304 the CFPB has barely filed any lawsuits against relief 
companies since 2017.305 Furthermore, under Mr. Mulvaney’s leadership, the CFPB 
filed a scant number of new actions against loan servicers despite the fact that data 
from 2018 show borrowers continue to submit a large number of complaints about 
loan servicers.306 In direct contradiction to the CFPB’s authority under the  
 
297. See Chris Arnold & Avie Schneider, Mick Mulvaney Effectively Fires CFPB Advisory 
Council, NPR ( June 6, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/06/617612219/mick-
Mr.Mulvaney-effectively-fires-cfpb-advisory-council [https://perma.cc/SQ4R-7SJA]; 12  
U.S.C. § 5494(a), (c) (2018) (requiring the creation of the Consumer Advisory Board). 
298. See Kate Berry, CFPB’s Mr. Mulvaney Looks to Rein in ‘Tyranny’ of Agency He Runs,  
AM. BANKER (Apr. 2, 2018, 3:33 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-mulvaney-
looks-to-rein-in-tyranny-of-agency-he-runs [https://perma.cc/JN8Q-SCRM] (stating that  
Mr. Mulvaney had already dropped six enforcement actions against payday lenders that were filed 
during Richard Cordray’s leadership).  
299. See Yuka Hayashi, States Target Consumer Issues as Federal Oversight Eases, WALL  
ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-target-consumer-issues-as-
federal-oversight-eases-1522920601 [https://perma.cc/6LXH-CPET].  
300. See Berry, supra note 298; Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ [https://perma.cc/5JRE-
H624] ( last visited Sept. 14, 2018). 
301. See McCoy, supra note 295, at 2583–84. 
302. See supra notes 284–285 and accompanying text. 
303. See Berry, supra note 298. 
304. See supra Sections I.A–D (discussing federal-state partnership that resulted in the filing of 
over 36 enforcement actions against relief companies and shutting down more than two dozen 
companies charged with operating phony relief programs). Even before this partnership was 
announced, the CFPB had filed enforcement actions against two relief companies. See generally Laurie 
A. Lucas & Christopher L. Peterson, Developments in Federal Student-Lending Law: Harbingers of 
Change?, 72 BUS. LAW. 465 (2017) (summarizing several lawsuits, including lawsuits filed against 
College Education Services and Student Loan Processing). 
305. See Yuka Hayashi, Mick Mulvaney’s Year at CFPB Has Pleased Financial Industry, Which 
Wants More, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2018, 1:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mick-mulvaneys-
year-at-cfpb-has-pleased-financial-industry-which-wants-more-1543158000 [https://perma.cc/ 
FFM7-9AZ9] (“The CFPB has announced nine enforcement actions since [Mulvaney] took over, down 
from 47 in the bureau’s final year . . . under Obama-appointed leadership.”). 
306. See Putting Consumers First? A Semi-Annual Review of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Seth Frotman, 
First to Printer_Johnson _EH Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  12:58 PM 
146 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:105 
Dodd-Frank Act, Mr. Mulvaney announced that the CFPB has supervisory 
authority over companies that service private student loans, instead of over Navient 
and other large servicers that handle federal student loans.307 Such a hands-off 
approach leaves borrowers to fend for themselves when attempting to get help from 
loan servicers and vulnerable to false promises of help from relief companies.  
Consider for a moment the success of the CFPB before Mr. Mulvaney 
assumed leadership.308 The CFPB had appointed a private student loan ombudsman 
(the CFPB Ombudsman) in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act,309 and opened 
the Office for Students and Young Consumers (OSYC) to address concerns unique 
to that population.310 The OSYC, under the leadership of the CFPB’s Ombudsman, 
was successful in receiving, analyzing, and resolving thousands of complaints by 
borrowers against their loan servicers and instrumental in uncovering evidence of 
the rampant alleged unlawful practices by loan servicers handling both private and 
federal loans.311  
After his arrival, Mr. Mulvaney, as widely reported by the media, acted in 
opposition to the CFPB’s Ombudsman and was accused of interfering with the 
enforcement action pending against Navient by derailing a potential settlement 
agreement.312 Without any explanation, Mr. Mulvaney suddenly closed the OSYC 
in May 2018 and purportedly made it a “unit” in the Office of Financial 
 
Executive Director, Student Borrower Protection Center), https://financialservices.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-wstate-frotmans-20190307.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY6Z-CUZJ]; Jim 
Probasco, Which Companies Had the Most Student Loan Complaints in 2018?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 8, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/cfpb-student-loan-complaints-for-2018-4582821 [https:// 
perma.cc/SDH5-X28S ] (noting that “the CFPB received nearly 10,000 student-loan-related 
complaints” in 2018). 
307. See Complaint at 2, Student Debt Crisis v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 2:19-cv-10048, 
2019 WL 6327221 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Student Debt Crisis v. Consumer  
Fin. Prot. Bureau Complaint ] (describing the CFPB’s supervisory authority under the Dodd-Frank Act 
over large market participants and alleging that the CFPB has violated the law by refusing to exercise 
its authority of large loan servicers accused of violating consumer protection laws). 
308. The CFPB was created as the first federal agency to have as its primary mission consumer 
protection. See Edward Balleisen & Melissa Jacoby, Consumer Protection After the Global Financial Crisis, 
107 GEO. L.J. 813, 818 (2019). To accomplish its objectives, the CFPB is “authorized to exercise its 
authorities under Federal consumer financial law” to ensure that “consumers are protected from unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination.” 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(1)–(2). 
309. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5535(a). 
310. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protc. Bureau, CFPB Announces New Additions to 
Senior Leadership (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-
announces-new-additions-to-senior-leadership-20160412/ [https://perma.cc/PAM7-2EJ4 ]. 
311. See, e.g., CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 203, at 2, 6 (reporting that, between September 
2016 and April 2017, the CFPB “handled approximately 12,900 federal student loan servicing 
complaints, 7,700 private student loan complaints, and approximately 2,300 debt collection complaints 
related to private or federal student loan debt”). 
312. See Stacy Cowley, How a Potential $1 Billion Student Loan Settlement Collapsed After Trump 
Won, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/business/student-loans-
navient.html [https://perma.cc/5V4S-FNKE]; ZIBEL, supra note 248, at 31–33 (describing a letter 
from Navient to Mr. Mulvaney and stating that Navient “pressed the CFPB to drop” its lawsuit  
against Navient). 
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Education.313 Because the OSYC was the office through which the CFPB’s 
Ombudsman conducted several statutorily mandated duties, Mr. Mulvaney’s closure 
in effect stripped Seth Frotman, the CFPB’s Ombudsman, of his ability to perform 
his duties.314 Because of Mr. Mulvaney’s closure of the OSYC and other harmful 
actions, Mr. Frotman submitted a scathing letter criticizing Mr. Mulvaney’s actions 
and resigned, in protest, from his position as the CFPB’s Ombudsman.315 
Mr. Mulvaney has been replaced by Kathleen Kraninger, who was narrowly 
confirmed as the CFPB’s permanent director.316 However, she appears to have no 
agenda that prioritizes the interests of borrowers with student loans.317 Under 
Director Kraninger’s leadership, the CFPB has done very little—filing only two new 
enforcement actions against a relief company and failing to file any new action 
against a loan servicing company, despite complaints about servicers  
from borrowers.318  
 
313. See U.S. Consumer Watchdog Sidelines Student Loan Office: Memo, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 
2018, 1:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/r-us-consumer-watchdog-sidelines-student-loan-
office-memo-2018-5 [https://perma.cc/6KG4-NZJA]. 
314. See McCoy, supra note 295, at 2574; Kate Berry, Mulvaney Guts CFPB’s Student Lending 
Office, AM. BANKER (May 9, 2018, 4:53 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/mulvaney-
guts-cfpbs-student-lending-office [https://perma.cc/66N2-A9FF] (reporting that Mr. Frotman and 
the “unit” had been relegated to “essentially working on pamphlets and web content about student 
loans, rather than examining complaints that could be referred to the CFPB’s enforcement division”). 
315. As a result of Mr. Mulvaney’s actions, academics and advocacy groups believe that he 
intentionally hamstrung the CFPB and has not demonstrated any commitment to protecting student 
loan borrowers. See McCoy, supra note 295, at 2574; Press Release, Ctr. for Am. Progress, CAP and 
Generation Progress Experts on Acting Director Mick Mulvaney Shuttering the Office of Students at 




316. See Neil Haggerty, Senate Barely Confirms Kathy Kraninger as New CFPB Director,  
AM. BANKER (Dec. 6, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/senate-barely-
confirms-kathy-kraninger-as-new-cfpb-director [https://perma.cc/9AW6-J4Q3] (stating that  
Ms. Kraninger, who formerly worked with Mr. Mulvaney in Office of Management and Budget, did 
not have any work-related experience in consumer finance and was barely confirmed in a vote of fifty 
to forty-nine). 
317. Director Kraninger testified before Congress and—despite being questioned about a 
variety of consumer-related issues—her answers appeared evasive and left listeners wondering, to put 
it mildly. See Ed Mierzwinski, CFPB’s Kraninger Provides Opaque Statement to Committee; Questions and 
Second Panel Will Be Critical, U.S. PIRG (Mar. 7, 2019), https://uspirg.org/blogs/eds-blog/usp/
cfpbs-kraninger-provides-opaque-statement-committee-questions-and-second-panel [https:// 
perma.cc/7V7V-2ANP]; Jim Puzzanghera, Democrats Assail New Consumer Watchdog, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://enewspaper.latimes.com/infinity/article_share.aspx?guid=6d91e70b-0546-
4b61-820a-1f65c783fc14 [https://perma.cc/75CZ-7ZGY] (reporting that when questioned before the 
U.S. House Financial Services Committee, Director Kraninger defended some actions taken by  
Mr. Mulvaney and would not commit to reversing any of his actions).  
318. See, e.g., Complaint at 6, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Chou Team Realty, LLC,  
No. 8:20-cv-00043 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2020) (alleging that defendants violated federal anti-telemarketing 
laws through their operation of student loan debt relief programs); see also Jim Saksa, Democrats Ready 
CFPB Scrutiny as Complaints About JP Morgan, Navient Emerge, CQ ROLL CALL WASH. BANKING 
BRIEFING, Jan. 8, 2019, at 1 (reporting results of an analysis of complaints submitted by student loan 
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To the surprise of many, Director Kraninger caused the CFPB to flip its 
position and side with the Department of Justice in asserting the structure of the 
CFPB—with a single director subject to removal only “for cause”—is 
unconstitutional.319 Her change in position came after a 2019 unanimous panel 
decision, where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the CFPB’s 
structure is constitutional and affirmed a district court’s order requiring a law firm 
to respond to a CFPB investigative demand.320 Despite the objections of her staff, 
Director Kraninger chose to support President Trump’s position that he can, for 
any reason, fire her as director of the CFPB. In doing so, she has put the CFPB in 
a precarious position because, as argued in Supreme Court amici briefs, many 
believe that the CFPB itself should be eliminated.321  
Evidence of the CFPB’s abdication of its duty to protect student loan 
borrowers popped up in May 2019 when someone from the CFPB tweeted, “If 
you’re having a hard time paying your student loans, you may qualify for loan 
forbearance.”322 This tweet was in stark contrast to the CFPB’s 2017 allegations 
against Navient. Specifically, the CFPB sued Navient for unlawfully steering 1.5 
million borrowers into multiple forbearances, causing borrowers to accrue nearly 
four billion dollars in additional interest, to miss out on the federal government 
 
borrowers to the CFPB and stating that the majority (42 percent) of the complaints were  
about Navient). 
319. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Will Decide Consitutionality of Consumer Watchdog 
Bureau, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2019, 3:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
courts_law/supreme-court-will-decide-constitutionality-of-consumer-watchdog-bureau/2019/10/18/ 
49362e68-f121-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414732_story.html [https://perma.cc/8ZNN-Y8JA] (summarizing 
how Director Kraninger reconsidered her position on the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure). 
320. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 140 
S. Ct. 427 (2019). This case involved a challenge by a debt-collection law firm, which argued that it did 
not have to respond to a CFPB investigative demand on the basis that the CFPB’s single-director 
leadership structure is unconstitutional. Id. at 682. Relying on precedent from the Supreme Court of 
the United States, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the “for-cause removal restriction protecting the 
CFPB’s Director does not ‘impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty’ to ensure 
that the laws are faithfully executed.” Id. at 684 (citations omitted). 
321. See Kate Berry, CFPB Critics to Supreme Court: The Agency Must Go, AM. BANKER  
( Jan. 2, 2020, 9:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-critics-to-supreme-court-the-
agency-must-go [https://perma.cc/27NM-82GT] (summarizing briefs arguing that the CFPB’s 
structure is unconstitutional); Melissa Angell, Inclusiv Breaks from Other Credit Union Groups over CFPB 
Structure, CREDIT UNION J. ( Jan. 28, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://www.cujournal.com/news/inclusiv-
breaks-from-other-credit-union-groups-over-cfpb-structure [https://perma.cc/Q37L-TGSC] 
(reporting that Inclusiv is the only trade association for credit unions to file an amicus brief in support 
of the CFPB’s structure). To defend the CFPB, the Supreme Court appointed Paul Clement, a former 
Republican solicitor general, to file an amicus curiae brief arguing that the CFPB’s structure does not 
violate the constitution. See Berry, supra; Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Judgment Below, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7, 2020 WL 353477  
(U.S. 2020). 
322. See Jillian Berman, Consumer Watchdog Tweets ‘Negligent or Worse’ Advice to Student-Loan 
Borrowers, Advocates Say, MARKETWATCH (May 30, 2019, 10:18 AM), https://
www.marketwatch.com/story/cfpb-tweet-offers-negligent-or-worse-student-loan-advice-advocates-
say-2019-05-29 [https://perma.cc/7GZM-KKJH]. 
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paying interest subsidies, and to lose time on the clock towards obtaining  
loan forgiveness.323  
In August 2019, Director Kraninger announced her appointment of Robert 
Cameron as the CFPB’s Student Loan Ombudsman, even though he had most 
recently served for several years as the deputy chief counsel for the Pennsylvania 
Higher Education Assistance Authority (PHEAA).324 As explained previously, 
several pending lawsuits against PHEAA allege that it violated numerous consumer 
protection laws by, among other things, grossly mismanaging the Public Service 
Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program.325 Notably, Director Kraninger’s 
announcement makes clear that Mr. Cameron’s title is the “Private Education Loan 
Ombudsman,” thereby prompting concerns that he will act only for a fraction of 
student loan borrowers, instead of for the large majority of borrowers who owe 
federal student loans.326 When pressed for clarification regarding the scope of  
Mr. Cameron’s duties as the ombudsman, Director Kraninger did not provide any 
clarification.327 When asked about the CFPB’s involvement in ensuring that 
borrowers receive forgiveness through the PLSF program, Director Kraninger 
stated that the program would be the responsibility of the Education Department.328 
In late 2019, Student Debt Crisis (SDC), a nonprofit student advocacy group, 
sued Director Kraninger and the CFPB for refusing to exercise supervisory 
authority over PHEAA and other large companies servicing federal student loans.329 
Specifically, the SDC alleges that Director Kraninger and the CFPB have violated 
the Administrative Procedures Act by adopting a new supervisory rule sub silentio 
and are, thereby, refusing to exercise existing regulatory authority to hold 
companies, which service over eighty-one percent of loans held by the federal 
government, accountable. 330  
Based on the foregoing, the CFPB and the Education Department have taken 
actions that protect the loan servicing industry but harm student loan borrowers. 
 
323. See supra notes 254–266 and accompanying text. 
324. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Appoints Private Education Loan 
Ombudsman (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-
appoints-private-education-loan-ombudsman/[https://perma.cc/7NP5-5NSW]. 
325. See supra notes 287–297 and accompanying text.  
326. The Consumer Bankers Association released a statement urging Mr. Cameron to work for 
the benefit of all borrowers at a time when “it is clear the federal student loan program is not 
working . . . .” See Nick Simpson, CBA Statement on CFPB Education Loan Ombudsman, CONSUMER 
BANKERS ASS’N (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.consumerbankers.com/cba-media-center/media-
releases/cba-statement-cfpb-education-loan-ombudsman [https://perma.cc/G9M5-PV4Z]. 
327. See Press Release, Jennifer Wexton, Congresswoman, U.S. House of Reps., Wexton Presses 
CFPB Director on Student Loan Ombudsman’s Conflicts of Interest, CFPB’s Failure to Advocate for 
Student Borrowers  (Oct. 17, 2019),  https://wexton.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx? 
DocumentID=127 [https://perma.cc/LY9H-YRJB]. 
328. See id. 
329. See Student Debt Crisis v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Complaint, supra note 307, at 2. 
330. Id. at 2, 28. 
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As a result, borrowers remain vulnerable to student loan scams and must, therefore, 
look to federal and state lawmakers to afford them additional protection.  
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO LIMIT THE ABILITY OF RELIEF COMPANIES TO 
TARGET BORROWERS  
In light of actions taken by the Education Department and the CFPB, federal 
and state lawmakers should adopt a multifaceted approach to combating student 
loan relief scams.331 The discussion of possible solutions begins with recently 
enacted legislation that would require the use of developing technology to protect 
all consumers from unlawful and unwanted telemarketing calls.332 This legislation 
allows the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), via rulemaking, to afford 
student loan borrowers a modest, but important, remedy that fits into an overall 
solution that is necessary to limit the ability of relief companies to defraud 
borrowers.333 Later, in Sections IV.B and IV.C, this Article recommends changes to 
pending federal and state legislation aimed specifically at protecting student loan 
borrowers.334 By incorporating the author’s suggested changes to pending 
legislation, lawmakers would afford student loan borrowers greater protection from 
relief scams.  
A. Borrowers Would Benefit from Pending Bipartisan Legislation That Would Require 
the Use of Technology to Block Robocalls and Spoofed Calls 
As revealed in the Operation Game of Loans litigation, some relief companies 
target borrowers with billions of robocalls, including robo-text messages,335 to 
defraud millions from student loan borrowers.336 Below is a brief explanation of the 
current technology that enables scammers to target consumers with robocalling and 
caller ID spoofing. Following that explanation is a discussion of recently enacted 
legislation that would require telecommunication (telecom) companies to 
implement new technologies to detect and block spoofed calls and robocalls.337  
 
331. See infra Section IV.B. (suggesting amendments to proposed legislation aimed specifically 
at preventing student loan relief scams). 
332. See infra notes 340–365 and accompanying text. 
333. See infra notes 350363 and accompanying text. 
334. See infra Section IV.B.–C. and accompanying text. 
335. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the FCC’s interpretation that a 
text message is considered a “call” within the meaning of the TCPA. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, 
Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009). Congress directed the FCC to “prescribe regulations to 
implement the requirements of” the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). 
336. See supra notes 123–154 and accompanying text (discussing litigation against companies 
that used robocalling and robo-texting to target borrowers). Written Testimony of David Frankel: 
Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging Issues 2 (2019) (statement of David Frankel, CEO, ZipDX 
LLC), https://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SCA_Frankel_7_17_19.pdf [
https://perma.cc/T83U-EJVA] (stating that a robocaller can dupe “[fifty] victims a day, each netting 
him $100”). 
337. See TRANSACTION NETWORK SERVS, ROBOCALL PROTECTION WHITE PAPER: 3 THINGS 
YOU NEED TO KNOW FOR 2017, at 5 (2017), https://tnsi.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
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Robocalls from relief companies are among the nearly fifty-nine billion 
robocalls Americans received in 2019.338 Almost all robocalls are unlawful; however, 
a small percentage of robocalls are legal for various purposes, including  
weather alerts.339  
Relief companies, like other scammers, are able to target millions daily due to 
the advent of “voice over Internet protocol,” known as VoIP, which allows 
companies to make calls cheaply from anywhere in the world.340 While many 
consumers have positive experiences with VoIP technology,341 it allows 
telemarketers and fraudsters to make an enormous number of calls with nothing 
more than an Internet connection and a computer.342 With robocalling software, a 
con artist can use the computer to call landline and mobile phone numbers from a 
computer-generated list or from “leaked databases of personal information” or 
“massive databases compiled from automated web searches.”343 Moreover, through 
a complex system of mostly digital networks, robocalling software is regularly 
combined with technology that spoofs caller ID systems to make it appear that each 
call is coming from a legitimate phone number.344  
 
TSD_RobocallWhitePaper_US_Mar17.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUF5-KURU] (describing various 
protocols for blocking robocalls and also explaining “Do-Not-Originate” technology that prevents 
scammers for spoofing numbers that belong to governmental entities (e.g., IRS) and individuals listed 
in the Do Not Call Registry); THE NEW CTR., ROBOCALLS: BIG TELECOM’S BIG PROBLEMS ( 2019), 
https://newcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Robocalls-Big-Telecom-s-Big-Problem.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/PB6U-YYGM]. 
338. See Mike Snider, Robocalls Rang Up a New High in 2019. Two or More Daily Is Average in 
Some States, USA TODAY ( Jan. 17, 2020, 1:12 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/01/
15/robocalls-americans-got-58-5-billion-2019/4476018002/ [https://perma.cc/8G3W-ZJSW]; 
Tom Still, Relief from Robocalls May Finally Be at Hand, WIS. ST. J., May 12, 2019, at D3; Press Release, 
Kara Kebler, Associate Director, Strategic Communications, Consumer Reps., Maureen Mahoney, 
Pol’y Analyst,  Consumer Reps., Consumer Reports Hosts Robocalls Roundtable on Capitol Hill to 
Seek Solutions for Nonstop, Predatory Calls, Consumers Union (Apr. 3, 2019), https://advocacy. 
consumerreports.org/press_release/consumer-reports-hosts-robocalls-roundtable-on-capitol-hill-to-
seek-solutions-for-nonstop-predatory-calls/ [https://perma.cc/U9PZ-N9NR] (reporting that 
consumers “lost nearly $9 billion to phone scams in the previous 12-month period” and that in March 
2019, Americans received 4.9 billion robocalls, a record number of calls in a single month); Do Not 
Call: Combating Robocalls and Caller ID Spoofing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Digit. Com.  
& Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong (2018) (statement of Scott 
Hambucken, Executive Vice President, First Orion Corp.), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF17/20180427/108190/HHRG-115-IF17-Wstate-HambuchenS-20180427.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V7PQ-9BPC]. 
339. See Snider, supra note 338. 
340. See Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech: First 
Amendment Lessons from the FCC’s TCPA Rules, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2018). 
341. See id. at 2930 (stating that individuals use VoIP technology when they chat with someone 
through Skype or Google Hangouts).  
342. See id.  
343. See Raymond Huahong Tu, Why Robocalls Are Unstoppable, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 27, 
2019, 12:55 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/why-robocalls-are-unstoppable [https:// 
perma.cc/R3RS-U8JT]. 
344. See supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text (describing “neighbor” spoofing, which 
makes it appear on the consumer’s caller ID display that the incoming call is local); Simon van  
Zuylen-Wood, How Robo-callers Outwitted the Government and Completely Wrecked the Do Not Call List, 
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Recognizing that federal laws have had little impact on the ever-increasing use 
of robocalling and call-spoofing, both the FTC and the FCC have, since 2012, 
incentivized stakeholders to develop technologies to combat illegal robocalling and 
call-spoofing.345 Both agencies have brought enforcement actions against 
robocallers, and have created working groups to get input from and share among 
carriers and other stakeholders technological advances to curb robocalling.346 
Today, major telecom carriers routinely block millions of robocalls.347 Using 
technology, commonly referred to as “traceback,” carriers trace a call made to a 
consumer back, as far as possible, through different VoIP providers to the original 
source.348 If the carrier determines that the source is a robocalling operation or is 
originating from a foreign country, the carrier can either block the call or allow it to 
come through to the consumer with a warning.349  
The telecom industry has also developed a system to detect spoofed calls by 
relying on two technologies, one called “Signature-Based Handling of Asserted 
Information Using Tokens,” and the other “Secure Telephone Identity Revisited,” 
collectively known as SHAKEN/STIR.350 Many consumers are still unaware of  
call-spoofing technology, and because many rely heavily on caller ID to assess 
 
WASH. POST: MAGAZINE ( Jan. 11, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
magazine/how-robo-call-moguls-outwitted-the-government-and-completely-wrecked-the-do-not-call-
list/2018/01/09/52c769b6-df7a-11e7-bbd0-9dfb2e37492a_story.html [https://perma.cc/CKR6-
F7KS]; see also Abusive Robocalls & How We Can Stop Them: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., 
Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. *1 (2018) (statement of Rosemary Harold, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, 
Federal Communications Commission), 2018 WL 1872121 (stating that “most large-scale unlawful 
robocall schemes employ caller ID spoofing”). 
345. See Hurwitz, supra note 340, at 35–36; Spencer Weber Waller et al., The Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology, 26 LOY. CONSUMER  
L. REV. 343, 390–91 (2014); Press Release, Joseph Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks 
at USTelecom Forum: Turning the Tide on Illegal Robocalls ( June 11, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/1527217/simons_-_us_telecom_robocall_event_6-11-
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D53-X28C] (discussing several FTC-sponsored competitions, all of which 
have been credited with companies developing hundreds of robocall-blocking apps and programs). 
346. Id.; see FCC REPORT ON ROBOCALLS, supra note 118. Since 2016, the FCC has urged  
U.S. carriers to develop technology aimed at curbing robocalls. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 
ROBOCALL STRIKE FORCE REPORT 4–7 (2016), https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/Robocall-Strike-
Force-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DD5-3K3G]. In 2017, the FCC issued a report and an 
order that authorized carriers and service providers to use technology to block unwanted and unlawful 
robocalls, and encouraged carriers to work cooperatively to share information to expand their  
call-blocking capabilities. See Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, 32 FCC 
Rcd. 9706, 9710 (2017) (Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). 
347. See Howard Buskirk & Jimm Phillips, FCC Told Challenges Remain on Technology to Fight 
Robocalls, COMMC’N DAILY, July 12, 2019, at 1; Dalvin Brown, ‘Scam Likely,’ So Answer at Your Own 
Risk, USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 2019, at B1 (describing measures adopted by carriers to limit robocalls). 
348. Id.  
349. See van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 344. For example, if T-Mobile allows a suspicious call to 
come through, the consumer will see the phone number on display with the words “Scam Likely.” See 
Buskirk & Phillips, supra note 347. 
350. See Combating Spoofed Robocalls with Caller ID Authentication, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication [https://perma.cc/KKE9-G7Q2] ( last visited Sept. 29, 
2020); Hurwitz, supra note 340, at 35–36. 
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legitimacy, they fall prey to scammers using spoofed robocalls.351 However, using 
the protocol of SHAKEN/STIR, a telecom provider can determine whether a  
U.S.-based relief company is spoofing, for example, a governmental number (e.g., 
the number to the Education Department) and then block the call, thereby 
preventing it from reaching the consumer.352  
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives rarely agree on anything 
legislatively; however, federal lawmakers, with nearly unanimous votes in both 
chambers, passed a bipartisan bill that was signed into law by President Trump to 
protect consumers against unlawful and unwanted calls.353 Under the  
Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence 
Act (TRACED Act),354 the FCC has to issue (within 18 months) a rule requiring 
voice service providers to implement the SHAKEN/STIR protocol for 
authenticating calls.355 The FCC also has to issue rules that establish when providers 
are allowed to use the protocol to block calls and establish a safe harbor to shield 
providers from liability when they, using the protocol, inadvertently block legitimate 
calls.356 The TRACED Act also requires the FCC to issue, within one year of 
enactment, a final rule mandating that providers offer call-blocking services, free of 
charge, on an opt-in or opt-out basis to consumers.357 
Under the TRACED Act, the FCC also has to finalize a rule that clarifies the 
definition of automatic telephone dialing systems (ATDS) through which 
companies make robocalls.358 Such clarification is necessary because major 
companies have been able to skirt the TCPA to make alleged unlawful robocalls by 
relying on a narrow definition of ATDS.359 The Act also makes it clear that text 
 
351. See Press Release, AARP, AARP Endorses House Legislation Targeting Illegal Robocalls 
( July 17, 2019), https://press.aarp.org/2019-7-17-Robocalls-TRACED-Legislation-House [https:// 
perma.cc/P3HN-TPJP] (reporting survey finding of “high consumer reliance on Caller ID”). 
352. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Crackdown Stops Operations 
Responsible for Billions of Illegal Robocalls (Mar. 26, 2019); see also FCC REPORT ON ROBOCALLS, 
supra note 118, at 7 (“[T]he Commission authorized providers to block Do Not Originate (DNO) calls 
as well as calls where the number purporting to originate the call is invalid, unallocated, or unused.”). 
353. The Senate passed by voice vote the final version of the bill after approving it by an 
astonishing vote of ninety-seven to one in May 2019. See Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal 
Enforcement and Deterrence Act, S. 151, 116th Cong. (2019). The House of Representatives passed 
the bill 417 to 3 on December 3, 2019, the same day the House Judiciary Committee opened its 
impeachment hearing of President Trump. 
354. President Trump signed the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal 
Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act) on December 30, 2019. See Telephone Robocall 
Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105, 133  
Stat. 3274 (2019). 
355. TRACED Act § 4(b)(1). 
356. See id. § 4(c)(1). 
357. See id. § 10(b). 
358. See id. 
359. See, e.g., Tony Romm, House Lawmakers Unveil Bipartisan Anti-Robocall Bill, WASH. POST 
( June 20, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/20/house-
lawmakers-unveil-bipartisan-anti-robocall-bill/ [https://perma.cc/A247-VTX4] (discussing a 
lawsuit filed against Hilton Grand Vacations Company for allegedly designing an automatic dialing 
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messages are considered “calls” under the TCPA, thereby aligning the definition 
with the FCC’s broad interpretation of “calls” to protect consumers from unwanted 
and unlawful messages sent to wireless phones.360  
The TRACED Act cannot stop all unwanted and unlawful calls.361 However, 
if the use of this technology had been required by law four years ago, telecom 
carriers would have been able to block calls from Mr. Christiano and his 
codefendants, who spoofed millions of robocalls offering bogus debt relief.362 
Because the TRACED Act empowers the FCC to allow the telecom industry to 
deploy the latest call-blocking and call-authenticating technologies,363 it will afford 
student loan borrowers a chance to avoid being contacted in the first place by relief 
companies and, ultimately, avoid being duped. 
Because relief companies exploit other forms of modern technologies to 
access borrowers’ online student loan accounts,364 as explained in the next section, 
additional technology-based solutions are necessary to deter relief scams.  
B. Federal Bipartisan Legislation Would Require the Education Department to Implement 
Technology to Detect and Prevent Relief Scams 
Federal lawmakers have introduced several bills to address various aspects of 
the student loan crisis,365 but only one federal bill directly deals with relief scammers 
and their use of technology to take over borrowers’ online loan accounts.366 Because 
this bipartisan bill has the support of the loan servicing industry and consumer 
advocacy groups, it has a chance of being enacted.367  
In 2019, Senators Tammy Baldwin, Mike Braun, Jeanne Shaheen, and Deb 
Fischer introduced a bipartisan bill entitled, Stop Student Debt Relief Scams Act 
(Stop Relief Scams Act).368 The Stop Relief Scams Act has the following four main 
 
system “in such a way that it narrowly avoided the government’s definition of a robocall — by having 
a human worker essentially just click a button”). 
360. See TRACED Act § 4(b)(1). 
361. See FCC REPORT ON ROBOCALLS, supra note 118, at 1415. 
362. See supra notes 124–129 and accompanying text. 
363. See supra notes 352–359 and accompanying text. 
364. See supra Sections I.A–D. 
365. See, e.g., Rebecca Klar, Warren Introduces Bill to Cancel Student Loan Debt for Millions, THE 
HILL ( July 23, 2019, 11:13 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/454293-warren-introduces-
bill-that-would-cancel-student-loan-debt-for-millions [https://perma.cc/7384-4ZCP] (discussing bill 
introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren (D. Mass.) to cancel student loan debt). A discussion of all 
these bills is beyond the scope of this Article. 
366. See infra notes 410–427 and accompanying text. 
367. New York has a proposed bill, but it is not a plausible solution, as it falsely assumes that 
there are legitimate for-profit debt relief companies. See NCCC President Keegan’s Statement on  
Gov. Cuomo’s State of the State Address, MALONE TELEGRAM ( Jan. 11, 2020), https://
www.mymalonetelegram.com/localliving/nccc-president-joe-keegan-s-statement-on-2020-state-of-the- 
state-address/article_1b8ca060-0356-5267-beff-7edf3db342c3.html [https://perma.cc/X584-JXBE]. 
368. Stop Student Debt Relief Scams Act, S. 1153, 116th Cong. (2019), https://
www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stop%20Student%20Debt%20Relief%20Scams%20Act.pdf  
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components: (1) making it a crime for anyone to access a borrower’s account 
through the information technology systems at the Education Department, (2) 
requiring the Education Department to create access to its systems to authorized 
third-party entities acting on behalf of borrowers, (3) requiring the Education 
Department to implement measures to detect and prevent relief scammers from 
accessing its systems, and (4) mandating counseling to warn borrowers about  
relief scams.369  
The criminal penalty provision in the Stop Relief Scams Act is based partially 
on recommendations made by the Office of Inspector General.370 In a 2018 report, 
the OIG recommended that Congress amend federal law to make it a crime for 
relief companies to fraudulently obtain access to borrowers’ online login 
credentials.371 To date, Brandon Frere is the only individual criminally indicted for 
perpetrating student loan relief scams, and he is accused of using his companies to 
defraud nearly 42,000 borrowers out of sixty million dollars in less than four 
years.372 The OIG recommended passage of a new criminal statute because it 
asserted that current criminal statutes could not be used effectively given that 
prosecutors must prove a minimum amount of monetary damages.373  
In keeping with this recommendation, the proposed Stop Relief Scams Act 
makes it a crime if a person “knowingly uses an access device . . . issued to another 
person or obtained by fraud or false statement to access the [Education] 
Department information technology systems for purposes of obtaining a 
commercial advantage or private financial gain, or in furtherance of any criminal or 
tortious act . . . .”374 A prosecutor would not have to prove a minimum amount of 
 
[https://perma.cc/JMV6-N5WN] (signed by Baldwin (D-WI), Mike Braun (R-IN), Jeanne Shaheen 
(D-NH) and Deb Fischer (R-NE)). 
369. See id. 
370. See id. The OIG’s Technology Crimes Division has a specialized unit that investigates the 
“[t]heft or misuse of credentials to unlawfully access ED information technology systems, including the 
National Student Loan Data System and the FAFSA submission Web site.” OFF. OF INSPECTOR  
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INVESTIGATION SERVICES, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/
invtreports/isgeneralbrochureonline.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL74-EX8B] ( last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 
371. See Letter from Kathleen S. Tighe, Inspector Gen., to Lamar Alexander, Chairman,  
U.S. Sen., Patty Murray, Ranking Member, U.S. Sen., Virginia Foxx, Chairwoman, U.S. House of Rep., 
and Bobby Scott, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Rep. 14 (Mar. 1, 2018) [hereinafter OIG 
Letter ], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/misc/lettertocongressonoighearecommendation 
smarch2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD7M-MWUR] (regarding Recommendations and  
Investigation Services). 
372. See Frere Crim. Complaint, supra note 191 (indicting Brandon Frere for committing wire 
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343). Brandon Frere formerly operated American Financial Benefits 
and related companies. See FTC v. Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr., No. 4:18-cv-00806-SBA, at *2  
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2018) (order granting preliminary injunction); see also supra notes 74–77, 162–177, 
191–195 (describing alleged unlawful practices by Brandon Frere and his companies). 
373. OIG Letter, supra note 371, at 11. 
374. Stop Student Debt Relief Scams Act, S. 1153, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019), https://
www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stop%20Student%20Debt%20Relief%20Scams%20Act.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/JMV6-N5WN].  
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financial gain, and those convicted under the proposed statute could be imprisoned 
up to five years and fined up to $20,000.375 
This proposed criminal statute would be effective in prosecuting individuals 
operating relief companies because they usually gain access to borrowers’ federal 
loan accounts.376 The proposed provision incorporates current law, which broadly 
defines “access device” to include someone’s account information.377 As previously 
explained, relief companies require each borrower to disclose personal information, 
including the borrower’s username and password, to access their online loan 
account information at the National Student Loan Data System, which is the loan 
database maintained by the Education Department.378 Relief companies are not 
entities that are authorized to access borrowers’ personal information via NSLDS, 
but they fraudulently mislead borrowers into disclosing their login information.379 
After accessing borrowers’ information through NSLDS, relief companies 
usually take over the loan accounts by changing the borrowers’ contact information 
and passwords.380 While in control of borrowers’ accounts, relief companies 
sometimes do nothing.381 Other times, companies contact the borrowers’ loan 
servicers and request either forbearance or a consolidation of the borrowers’ federal 
loans.382 A few relief companies submit applications with falsified information to 
get borrowers enrolled in income-driven repayment plans with lower monthly 
payments.383 However, these companies keep the borrowers’ monthly payments 
instead of sending them to the borrowers’ loan servicers.384 All of the foregoing 
actions are financially harmful to the borrowers because their loan balances will 
increase due to their failure to make payments to the actual loan servicers.385 Until 
borrowers uncover the truth, relief companies charge the borrowers’ credit cards or 
 
375. Id.  
376. See supra notes 211–233 and accompanying text.  
377. Id. (incorporating the definition of access device in 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1)); 18  
U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) (“[T]he term ‘access device’ means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic 
serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification number, or other 
telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier, or other means of account access that 
can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other 
thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds . . . .”) (emphasis added). This is broad 
enough to include a borrower’s personal identification number (also referred to as Federal Aid Student 
ID) for their federal student loans. 
378. See, e.g., supra notes 220–227 and accompanying text (describing Student Aid  
Center’s practices).  
379. Id.  
380. See FTC’s Operation Game of Loans, supra note 59. 
381. See, e.g., FTC v. Good EBusiness, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-01048 ODW-JPR, 2016 WL 3704489, 
at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2016). 
382. See, e.g., supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text (discussing Student Consulting Group, 
which consolidated a borrower’s loan after obtaining her student loan account information). 
383. See Complaint at 14, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Consumer Advoc. Ctr.,  
No. 8:19-cv-01998 JVS, 2019 WL 5721909 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2019). 
384. See id. at 13. 
385. See supra notes 212–233 and accompanying text. 
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debit their bank accounts to collect monthly fees for bogus programs.386 As a result, 
relief companies could be convicted of a crime under the proposed Stop Relief 
Scams Act because they “knowingly use” an “access device” (i.e., the NSLDS 
username and password) issued to another (i.e., the borrower) for “private  
financial gain.”387  
In addition to criminalizing a relief company’s unlawful access to a borrower’s 
loan account, the proposed Stop Relief Scams Act would require the Education 
Department to establish a third-party access account to the NSLDS only for an 
“authorized person.”388 Under this provision, authorized persons include 
governmental entities as well as licensed attorneys representing borrowers or their 
parents, and such persons would have access to a borrower’s account information 
through a different account number.389  
The third-party-access provision would make it easier for borrowers to get 
legitimate help from reputable attorneys; however, this provision has potential 
problems.390 First, under this proposed provision, an authorized person would also 
include a “nonprofit organization, providing financial or student loan repayment 
counseling to a student, borrower, or parent.”391 Some relief companies are actually 
organized under state laws as nonprofit organizations.392 For example, the Texas 
attorney general sued a group of defendants, one of which was a Texas-based 
nonprofit called “Your Student Loan Relief Organization.”393 The defendants were 
charged with numerous state-law violations, including charging borrowers up-front 
fees and putting their loans into forbearance without their permission.394 Similarly, 
prior to dissolution, Consumer Assistance Project, a Florida-based nonprofit 
organization, was charged with targeting borrowers by highlighting its nonprofit 
status and misleading them into believing that their “membership” fees were  
 
386. See FTC’s Operation Game of Loans, supra note 59. 
387. See infra notes 477–483 and accompanying text. 
388. See Stop Student Debt Relief Scams Act,  S. 1153,  116th Cong.  §  4  (2019),  https://
www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stop%20Student%20Debt%20Relief%20Scams%20Act.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/JMV6-N5WN]; FTC’s Operation Game of Loans, supra note 59.  
389. See Stop Student Debt Relief Scams Act § 2.  
390. Just because a borrower may have hired an attorney does not mean the borrower is 
immune from being scammed. See Mortgage Relief Scams, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 2018), https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0100-mortgage-relief-scams [https://perma.cc/C343-SFPD] 
(explaining to consumers about the warning signs of a foreclosure relief scam and providing consumers 
with tips about how to find a reputable licensed attorney). 
391. Stop Student Debt Relief Scams Act § 4. 
392. See infra notes 395–398 and accompanying text. 
393. See Plaintiff’s Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction and Permanent 
Injunction at 6, Texas v. Student Loan Relief, LLC, No. D-1-GN-17-005516, 2017 WL 4390722  
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2017). 
394. See MICHAEL RIGBY, TEX. OFF. OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, LEGAL DEPARTMENT 
REPORT 62 (2018), https://www.fc.texas.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/fc-081718.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9EZV-ZQNK] (reporting that the defendants in Student Loan Relief, LLC, 2017 WL 
4390722, subsequently agreed to a preliminary injunction that bans them from charging consumers for 
goods and services). 
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tax-deductible.395 Therefore, a relief company can be a legally registered nonprofit 
organization under state law while simultaneously perpetrating a for-profit student 
loan relief scam. Thus, the proposed bill should be amended to require the 
Education Department to conduct a reasonable investigation of a nonprofit 
organization and determine that it is legitimate before granting it third-party access 
to the NSLDS.396 
The proposed Stop Relief Scams Act also needs to address relief companies 
that will claim to have the right to access a borrower’s NSLDS account on the basis 
that they have a “power of attorney” (POA) form completed by the borrower.397 
Recall that numerous relief companies make borrowers complete and e-sign the 
POA form granting the companies permission to contact the borrowers’ loan 
servicers to purportedly negotiate a payment reduction or debt elimination.398 
Litigation against several relief companies demonstrates that this is just another 
means of keeping borrowers in the dark.399 Generally, a POA form has to be 
notarized by the individual appearing in person before a notary public and signing 
the form.400 In the Minnesota lawsuit filed against Student Aid Center, employees 
of the company sent to the borrowers’ loan servicers completed POA forms in 
which borrowers’ signatures had been forged.401 Moreover, some of the forms had 
attestations by the notary who falsely represented that borrowers residing in 
Minnesota had actually appeared in person in the state of Florida, where Student 
Aid Center was located.402  
Similarly, in the enforcement action filed against Consumer Assistance Project 
(CAP), an in-house attorney for Navient stated that, in a limited search of Navient’s 
computer systems, he uncovered eighty-five accounts with the names “Consumer 
Assistance Project” or “Consumer Assistance” and with POA forms he believed to 
 
395. See Read, supra note 65, at 5 (stating that the company’s nonprofit status was eventually 
revoked by the state of Florida). 
396. See Stop Student Debt Relief Scams Act,  S. 1153,  116th Cong.  §  2  (2019),  https://
www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stop%20Student%20Debt%20Relief%20Scams%20Act.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/JMV6-N5WN] (lacking any requirement that a nonprofit organization seeking 
third-party access is a legitimate entity). 
397. See id. (stating that an authorized person includes “the attorney or other individual [who] 
has consent from the relevant student, borrower, or parent to access the system”). 
398. See, e.g., Complaint at 127, Illinois v. FDATR, Inc., No. 2017CH13732, 2017 WL 4611807, 
at *24 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 2017) (alleging that defendants made consumers sign a “Limited Power of 
Attorney,” where the defendants were supposed to, among other things, negotiate for borrowers to 
receive lower payments on their federal student loan debt); Complaint at 58, Massachusetts v. Student 
Loan Relief, Inc., No. 18-2943A, 2018 WL 5825352, at *10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2018) (alleging 
that Texas-based companies required borrowers to sign a contract and a POA and alleging that because 
the defendants were granted a POA, they violated their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of  
the borrowers). 
399. See, e.g., supra notes 216–218 and accompanying text.  
400. See Complaint, FDATR, 2017 WL 4611807, at *24 (No. 2017CH13732); Complaint, 
Student Loan Relief, Inc., 2018 WL 5825352, at *10 (No. 18-2943A). 
401. See, e.g., Minn. v. SAC Complaint, supra note 67, at 17–19. 
402. Id.  
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be fraudulent even though the forms were purportedly completed by borrowers.403 
Of these accounts, only one borrower had obtained a loan discharge, but Navient’s 
attorney could not determine whether the borrower had obtained a discharge based 
on his or her efforts.404  
Given that relief companies deceptively use POA forms,405 the proposed Stop 
Relief Scams Act should be amended to make clear that a borrower’s completed 
POA form does not prevent a relief company from being criminally charged with 
unlawfully accessing a borrower’s NSLDS account.  
The proposed Stop Relief Scams Act is also worthy of consideration because 
it would require the Education Department “to maintain common-sense reporting, 
detection, and prevention activities to stop potential or known debt relief scams.”406 
However, the proposed bill does not provide any specifics about how such activities 
could be accomplished.407 Clearly, a new system by the Education Department 
needs to automatically flag as suspicious any company claiming the authority to act 
for a borrower based on a POA form.  
Because the proposed federal law would require the Education Department to 
develop a system of detecting and preventing debt relief scams,408 this Article 
recommends Congress consider requiring the Education Department to implement 
a multifactor authentication (MFA) process, using at least four factors to detect 
suspicious activity and to prevent scammers from accessing borrowers’ online 
accounts.409  
Many companies in the private sector already use a four-factor MFA system 
that requires the following: (1) something the consumer has (e.g., smartphone), (2) 
something the consumer knows (e.g., password or PIN), (3) something the 
consumer is (e.g., a biometric characteristic such as a fingerprint), and (4) something 
the consumer does (e.g., behavior pattern).410 As discussed above, relief companies 
 
403. See Decl. of Joshua Harkleroad at exhibit PX06 at 1, 3, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction & Supporting Memorandum of Law, FTC v. Consumer Assistance, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-21528 
(S.D. Fla. May 19, 2016) [hereinafter “FTC Motion Against CAP”] (describing his years of employment 
by Navient as well as FedLoan servicing and opining that CAP’s POA forms contain several red flags). 
404. Id. at 5.  
405. See supra notes 399–404, infra note 406, and accompanying text. 
406. Baldwin, Braun, Shaheen, Fischer Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Stop Student Debt Relief 
Scams, TAMMY BALDWIN: U.S. SENATOR FOR WIS. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/ 
press-releases/stop-student-debt-relief-scams-act [https://perma.cc/N2DJ-58QC]; See Stop Student 
Debt Relief Scams Act, S. 1153, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Stop%20Student%20Debt%20Relief%20Scams%20Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMV6-N5WN]. 
407. Id.  
408. Id. § 5. 
409. See infra notes 412–427 and accompanying text.  
410. See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ENTITY AUTHENTICATION ASSURANCE  
FRAMEWORK: RECOMMENDATION ITU-T X.1254, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter AUTHENTICATION 
FRAMEWORK ], https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.1254-201209-S!!PDF-
E&type=items [https://perma.cc/9P3X-DYLW]; Louis Columbus, CIO’s Guide to Stopping Privileged 
Access Abuse – Part I, BUS. 2 CMTY. (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.business2community.com/strategy/
cios-guide-to-stopping-privileged-access-abuse-part-i-02193903 [https://web.archive.org/web/2019042 
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usually get a wealth of information so they can easily pass the first two factors, 
especially if they hijack a borrower’s cell phone number and then reset the 
borrower’s password.411 Moreover, because the large majority of consumers use the 
same password for multiple accounts,412 a relief company could use a borrower’s 
cell phone password and unlawfully access a borrower’s information across  
multiple platforms.  
The Education Department could require the third factor in a MFA system, 
which relies on a biometric characteristic (e.g., fingerprint); however, such reliance 
is not foolproof.413 In 2014, hackers breached the records of the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management and stole personal data, including fingerprints, on almost 
twenty-two million current and former federal employees and contractors.414 A 
foreign government is suspected of being behind the breach, and the business 
community asserts that hackers armed with this information can bypass an MFA 
system to harm others.415 Moreover, in 2017, within days of Apple’s launch of the 
iPhone X, a foreign company was able to create 3D printed masks to circumvent 
the iPhone’s facial recognition security system and unlock the iPhone.416 Then, in 




411. See, e.g., Student Consulting Group Complaint, supra note 88, at 9 (alleging that “[d]efendant 
requires consumers to provide personal and financial information including: name, address, driver’s 
license number, employer’s name and location, two personal references, annual income, tax filing status, 
spouse information, and the consumer’s unique NSLDS pin code”). 
412. See Monica C. Meinert, Better Security Through Biometrics, A.B.A. BANKING J. (Dec. 28, 
2016), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2016/12/better-security-through-biometrics/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3LCX-M5PU] (citing a 2015 study revealing that twenty-one percent of individuals used 
the same password for over ten years and that an “overwhelming 73 percent of online accounts are 
guarded by duplicated passwords, making it that much easier for hackers to take down multiple accounts 
by cracking just one password”). 
413. See id. (suggesting that, while a “biometric defense is superior to a knowledge-based one,” 
it could become unreliable under certain environmental conditions, including in crowded areas and 
dimly-lit spaces); AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 410, at 29 (stating that fingerprints can 
be forged and that the authentication framework requires the ability to detect “use of artificial  
biometric characteristics”). 
414. See Sherif Samy, How Secure Are Biometrics?, CREDIT UNION TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018, 7:00 
PM), https://www.cutimes.com/2018/02/02/how-secure-are-biometrics/?slreturn=20200621011144 
[https://perma.cc/6RJ6-UB3F]. 
415. See id.; Isaac Stone Fish, China Has Access to Grindr Activity. We Should All Be Worried., 
WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/09/
why-we-cant-leave-grindr-under-chinese-control/ [https://perma.cc/CT25-ZFH6] (discussing 
concerns about China’s ability to access phone data after Beijing company’s acquisition of Grindr). 
416. See Samy, supra note 414; Thomas Brewster, Apple Face ID ‘Fooled Again’ – This Time by 
$200 Evil Twin Mask, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2017, 5:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
thomasbrewster/2017/11/27/apple-face-id-artificial-intelligence-twin-mask-attacks-iphone-x/#2039 
b2eb2775 [https://perma.cc/R8XE-QFV9]; Angela Moscaritolo, Hacker Beats Galaxy S10 
Fingerprint Scanner With 3D Print, PCMAG (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.pcmag.com/news/hacker-
beats-galaxy-s10-fingerprint-scanner-with-3d-printer [https://perma.cc/2DJJ-AESM].  
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creating a 3D-printed fingerprint.417 Consequently, biometric authentication should 
be viewed as a layer in a MFA system, not a replacement of other methods  
of verification.418 
The fourth factor in a MFA system uses technology to verify a person based 
on their behavior.419 Behavioral verification is necessary because fraudsters can 
uncover a wealth of information about consumers by gleaning information from 
data breaches and consumers’ digital “life print”—the information millions of 
online users leave behind or have available on social media platforms, unsecured 
websites, or online public records.420 A technology-based behavioral analysis of the 
purported user would be able to determine, for example, if the consumer is 
accessing the online account via a new or previously unknown device and unknown 
or foreign IP address.421  
Because the above-recommended MFA system relies exclusively on modern 
technology,422 this Article proposes that the Education Department incorporate a 
MFA system that includes an authentication factor using written notices sent by 
U.S. mail to borrowers and persons closely connected to them.423 When individuals 
complete applications for student loans, they supply the names and contact 
information for references, and these references are usually relatives. Also, for 
private student loans, lenders often require borrowers to get credit-worthy 
individuals, usually relatives, to agree to be cosigners to obtain private loans.424 
Whenever the author’s proposed MFA system detects suspicious behavior (e.g., 
email address and password are changed), the Education Department should be 
required to send written notices by U.S. mail to the references and cosigners listed 
in the borrower’s loan application or to the borrower’s last known mailing address. 
The expected outcome is that relatives will then make direct contact with the 
borrower and warn her about being the possible victim of a student loan relief scam.  
 
417. See Moscaritolo, supra note 416 (describing how one researcher used a 2D printout to 
bypass the facial recognition feature on the OnePlus 6 phone). 
418. See Tom Saunders, Biometrics Are a Security Supplement, But No More Than That, 
PAYMENTS SOURCE ( Jan. 28, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.paymentssource.com/opinion/
biometrics-are-a-security-supplement-but-no-more-than-that [https://perma.cc/8LUY-GGS8] 
(describing how someone hacked the iPhone 5’s fingerprint sensor “after a high-resolution photo was 
taken of a fingerprint on a glass surface and used to successfully unlock the device”). 
419. See AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 410, at 28. 
420. See Meinert, supra note 412 (discussing the emergence of behavioral authentication factors, 
such as keystroke patterns); TELECOMMS. REPS. INT’L, INC., CYBERSECURITY POLICY REPORT (2019), 
2019 WLNR 5001676 (discussing behavior factors in MFA process, such as logging in from unknown 
device). Recall that American Financial is accused of personally targeting borrowers by scraping 
information from their Facebook profiles. See supra notes 162–177 and accompanying text. 
421. TELECOMMS. REPS. INT’L, INC., supra note 420. 
422. See AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 410, at 27–29 (explaining in detail a MFA 
system to prevent fraud occurring in the digital world). 
423. See infra notes 426–428 and accompanying text.  
424. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Complaint, supra note 23, at 26 (stating that 
lenders usually require borrowers to have a co-signor in order to obtain a private student loan). 
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The written notice about the detection of suspicious behavior should do the 
following: summarize the activities deemed suspicious, inform borrowers about the 
loan servicer’s duty to provide free help in selecting appropriate repayment options, 
inform borrowers about the warning signs of a fraudulent relief program, and 
require borrowers to contact their loan servicer directly. The notice should also 
summarize the various repayment plans and forgiveness programs and warn 
borrowers that forbearance or deferment is not an appropriate debt management 
solution for most borrowers. The notice should also provide contact information 
that connects borrowers directly to the office of their state’s ombudsman and 
directly to the consumer complaint division of their state’s office of the attorney 
general. Moreover, the written notice should inform the borrower that no changes 
will be implemented until the borrower makes direct contact with the company that 
is actually authorized to service the borrower’s loan. Finally, the written notice 
should provide the borrower with a unique access code to be used as part of the 
verification process for the borrower to make changes, including enrolling in an 
appropriate repayment plan.  
This written-notice-verification method through the U.S. mail system is one 
sensible approach to combatting relief scams. That is because the relief companies 
usually perpetrate their scams via telecommunications and online platforms.425 
Adding the written notice requirement is a tangible step to the authentication 
process that should prevent fraud in the long run.  
At this time, the fate of the Stop Student Debt Relief Scams Act is uncertain 
because this proposed act was advanced by the House Education and Labor 
Committee and recently incorporated into an amended markup of the College 
Affordability Act.426 Nevertheless, the above-discussed provisions of the Stop 
Student Debt Relief Scams Act, along with the author’s suggestions,427 should be 
enacted because they would give law enforcement a criminal statute suited for 
indicting relief scammers and would require the Education Department to develop 
systems that detect and deter student loan relief scams.428 
C. Federal and State Lawmakers Can Empower Ombudsmen to Advocate for Borrowers  
In addition to including the aforementioned provisions requiring the 
Education Department to detect and deter relief scams, the comprehensive College 
Affordability Act currently includes provisions to deal with the “ombudsman crisis” 
 
425. See supra notes 109–200 and accompanying text (describing how relief companies use 
telecommunication and digital technologies to target potential borrowers). 
426. See College Affordability Act, H.R. 4674, 116th Cong. § 1031 (2019); Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 4674 (2019) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments to CAA], https://
edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/HR4674ANS1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6P48-AABG] 
[hereinafter Proposed Amendments to CAA].  
427. See supra notes 370–426 and accompanying text.  
428. See Proposed Amendments to CAA, supra note 426, §§ 4628, 4722. 
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at both the CFPB and the Education Department.429 As explained below, the lack 
of a true federal ombudsman to advocate for borrowers is an indication that federal 
and state lawmakers must act to protect borrowers.430 
Recall that Kathy Kraninger, the director of the CFPB, raised concerns among 
lawmakers and the banking industry when she appointed Robert Cameron as the 
CFPB’s Ombudsman.431 This was in spite of the fact that he had most recently 
served long-term as chief counsel for a large loan servicer repeatedly sued for 
engaging in unlawful collection and servicing practices.432 Mr. Cameron assumed 
the title “Private Student Loan Ombudsman” and has taken a very limited view of 
his duties.433 
Similarly, the Education Department also has an Ombudsman Group in the 
Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA). But, under Secretary DeVos’s leadership, the 
Ombudsman Group states that it “is a neutral, informal, and confidential resource 
to help resolve disputes about your federal student aid.” 434 That Group no longer 
shares with the CFPB data regarding student borrower complaints as required under 
federal law, and CFPB Director Kraninger has chosen not to file suit against the 
Education Department to obtain the data.435 As a result, in late 2019, Student Debt 
 
429. See id. § 1031 (explaining the duties of the Borrower Advocate). However, while the bill 
has a section calling for “counseling,” it does not actually require the type of education borrowers need 
to avoid fraud. See infra notes 440–474 and accompanying text (proposing that borrowers receive 
education from the CFPB’s ombudsman and state-created ombudsmen or advocates). 
430. See infra notes 440–474 and accompanying text.  
431. See Kate Berry, CFPB Names Student Loan Servicing Exec as Ombudsman, AM. BANKER 
(Aug. 19, 2019, 4:05 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-names-student-loan-
servicing-exec-as-ombudsman [https://perma.cc/3A59-9PQ8]; David Baumann, Heated House 
Hearing for CFPB’s Kraninger as Dems Go On the Attack, CREDIT UNION TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019, 1:56 
PM), https://www.cutimes.com/2019/10/16/heated-house-hearing-for-cfpbs-kraninger-as-dems-
go-on-the-attack/?slreturn=20200023110229 [https://perma.cc/WM8T-5BWN]. 
432. See Berry, supra note 431; Baumann, supra note 431. 
433. Berry, supra note 431; see supra notes 382–384 and accompanying text; Stacy Cowley, 
Student Loan Watchdog Job Given to an Industry Executive, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/business/student-loan-watchdog-insider.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9QT6-2B6H]. 
434. Feedback and Ombudsman, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/feedback-
ombudsman [https://perma.cc/XP8C-457L] ( last visited Sept. 29, 2020); Courtney Nagle, What to 




about-state-regulations-on-student-loans ] (stating that the FSA Ombudsman Group is not an advocate 
for student borrowers). 
435. See Chris Arnold, CFPB Chief Says Education Department Is Blocking Student Loan 
Oversight, NPR (May 16, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/16/723568597/cfpb-chief-
says-education-department-is-blocking-student-loan-oversight [https://perma.cc/E2PV-NQ4Z]; 
supra notes 384–386 and accompanying text; see also ALLIED PROGRESS, IN FIRST YEAR ON JOB, 
KRANINGER PUT INDUSTRY DEMANDS AHEAD OF CONSUMER CONCERNS (2019), http://
alliedprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/REPORT-Kraninger-First-Year-As-CFPB-Director-
A-Disaster-For-Consumers-Fact-Checked.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BRG-LNS2] (discussing actions 
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Crisis, a nonprofit student advocacy group, filed suit against Director Kraninger, 
Secretary DeVos, the CFPB, and the Education Department.436 The SDC is asking 
the court to order the CFPB and the Education Department to reinstate the 
memoranda of understanding, requiring the Education Department to share 
complaint data about loan servicers to the CFPB.437 Also, the SDC is seeking both 
a declaratory judgement that the CFPB has supervisory authority over large 
companies that service federal student loans and an order requiring that Director 
Kraninger and the CFPB essentially exercise supervisory authority over  
those companies.438 
Several bills have been introduced on a federal level to require both the CFPB 
and the Education Department through their respective ombudsman offices to 
share data and fulfill their other regulatory duties.439 The discussion below will focus 
on two different bills, one aimed at the CFPB’s ombudsman and another aimed at 
the Education Department’s Ombudsman Group.440 
In 2019, Representatives Mary Gay Scanlon and Ilhan Omar introduced the 
Student Borrower Advocate Act to transform the Education Department’s 
Ombudsman Group into the Office of the Borrower Advocate.441 This bill was 
recently incorporated into the comprehensive College Affordability Act, and it 
would require the Borrower Advocate to provide “timely assistance” to 
borrowers.442 The Borrower Advocate would have several mandates, including 
receiving and responding to the borrowers’ complaints and attempting to help them 
to resolve problems with their loan servicers.443 The College Affordability Act 
would also require the Borrower Advocate to “compile and analyze data on 
borrower complaints and share such data” with the CFPB.444 The bill would also 
restrict who could be hired as the Borrower Advocate so that an industry-insider 
such as Mr. Cameron would be ineligible for the position.445 In short, the College 
Affordability Act seeks to require the Education Department to have an advocate 
 
taken by Director Kraninger during the first year of her term and explaining why such actions are 
harmful for consumers). 
436. See generally Student Debt Crisis v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Complaint, supra note 307. 
437. See id. at 30.  
438. Id. at 29–30.  
439. See infra notes 441–473 and accompanying text; see also CFPB Student Loan Integrity and 
Transparency Act of 2019, H.R. 2833, 116th Cong. (2019). Representative Katie Porter introduced a 
bill that would have required the Education Department to share information with the CFPB, required 
loan servicers to provide any requested information to the CFPB or its Ombudsman, and required the 
CFPB to fully staff job positions in all of its units, including the Ombudsman’s office. 
440. See infra notes 441–474 and accompanying text.  
441. See Student Borrower Advocate Act, H.R. 4627, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
442. See Proposed Amendments to CAA, supra note 426, at 93.  
443. Id. at 95–96.  
444. Id. at 96.  
445. Id. at 94 (banning the Education Secretary from appointing anyone “employed by, or had 
a financial interest in, any [loan servicer or similar] entity in any of the five years preceding the date of 
the individual’s appointment”).  
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that is not biased in favor of the loan servicing industry and that possesses work 
experience that has prepared him or her to advocate for student borrowers.446  
Similarly, Maxine Waters, Chairwoman of the U.S. House Financial Services 
Committee, introduced legislation titled the Consumers First Act to allow career 
professionals to continue at the CFPB.447 Specifically, this bill would require 
adequate staffing at the CFPB and, in addition, would limit the number of positions 
that could be filled by political appointees.448 Both provisions should ensure that 
competent professionals are hired and limit the hiring of individuals who are 
motivated to sabotage the CFPB’s mission of protecting consumers.449 The 
Consumers First Act would also require the CFPB to keep its online consumer 
complaint database transparent and publicly accessible,450 thereby preventing a 
future director from shutting down the database.451 This database, which now has 
over 1.5 million complaints, including thousands about loan servicers, is important 
to preserve because it is critical to holding companies accountable for recurring 
problems in the marketplace.452 
The proposed Consumers First Act would also make the Office of Students 
and Young Consumers (OSYC) a statutorily-created, stand-alone office because it 
is also critically important to protecting student loan borrowers.453 The proposed 
bill would not only put the ombudsman in charge of the OSYC but also give that 
person the title of “Assistant Director and Student Loan Ombudsman” and the 
 
446. See id.  
447. See Consumers First Act of 2019, H.R. 1500, 116th Cong. (2019); infra note 449 and 
accompanying text (discussing how political appointees are replacing professionals and undermining 
the work of the CFPB). 
448. See H.R. 1500 § 5(c). 
449. According to news reports, Mr. Mulvaney replaced career professionals at the CFPB with 
political appointees. See Yuka Hayashi, At Consumer Finance Agency, a Critic Is Now the One Pulling the 
Levers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpbs-wizard-of-oz-
puts-trump-plans-into-practice-1540130400 [https://perma.cc/GR4F-7F98]; see also Kate Berry, 
Former CFPB Official ‘May Have Abused His Authority’: Inspector General, AM. BANKER ( July 29, 
2019, 12:42 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/former-cfpb-official-may-have-abused-
his-authority-inspector-general [https://perma.cc/MV9M-X37G] (quoting letter from U.S. Senators 
who stated: “Political appointees do not have the same hiring requirements as career staff and are often 
chosen for their political views, rather than their expertise.”). 
450. See H.R. 1500 § 5(d). 
451. See David Lazarus, Keeping a Lid on Data at CFPB, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2018 (reporting 
that Mr. Mulvaney, who threatened to shutter the database, told a banking industry audience that he 
does not “have to run a Yelp for financial services sponsored by the federal government”). 
452. See Kelly Thompson Cochran, The CFPB at Five Years: Beyond the Numbers, 21  
N.C. BANKING INST. 55, 69 (2017) (describing the benefits of the complaint database as affording 
companies the ability to be “more responsive to customer dissatisfaction levels through proactively 
monitoring social media and other sources to reduce the odds of receiving a complaint via the CFPB”); 
Putting Consumers First? A Semi-Annual Review of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Before the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Linda Jun, Senior Policy Counsel, Americans 
for Financial Reform) (stating that companies that have been unresponsive to consumers complaining 
directly to the companies, respond after consumers have submitted online complaints through the 
CFPB’s database). 
453. See H.R. 1500 § 6. 
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authority to assist in all of the CFPB’s supervisory, regulatory, and enforcement 
authority.454  
In summary, the foregoing proposed bills are in step with the statutory duties 
of the Education Department as well as the duties of the CFPB, which was the first 
and only federal agency with consumer protection as its primary mission.455 The 
proposed bills would ensure that the Education Department provides student loan 
data to the CFPB and ensure that the CFPB’s Ombudsman would be independent 
and able to operate through a permanent OSYC and fulfill its duties regardless of 
who occupies the White House.456  
Recognizing that the CFPB’s Ombudsman has played a critical role in assisting 
thousands of borrowers, eight states and the District of Columbia have recently 
passed laws that, at a minimum, create a state ombudsman.457 Similar to the CFPB’s 
Ombudsman,458 these new laws require the ombudsman to assist borrowers by 
receiving and responding to borrowers’ complaints and attempting to help 
borrowers resolve problems with their loan servicers.459 The state ombudsman is 
also required to compile and analyze student loan data.460 In some states, the 
ombudsman is also required to create educational materials or courses to inform 
borrowers of their rights when dealing with loan servicers.461 
An ombudsman position created under state laws is the right course of action 
in light of harmful actions taken by Trump appointees heading the CFPB and the 
Education Department.462 This Article recommends, however, that states expand 
the state ombudsman’s duties to include receiving complaints about relief 
 
454. See id.  
455. See supra notes 439–454 and accompanying text.  
456. Id. 
457. These new laws are referred to often as “Student Loan Borrowers’ Bill of Rights.” The 
District of Columbia and eight states (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Maine, New Jersey, 
Nevada, and Washington) have enacted laws imposing licensing requirements on student loan servicers. 
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-25 (West 2019); An Act to Establish a Student Loan Bill of Rights 
To License and Regulate Student Loan Servicers, 2019 Me. Legis. Serv. 2, § 14-104 (West);  
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-847 (2018); S.B. 1149, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019); Assemb. B. 383, 
2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019); California Student Loan Servicing Act, Assemb. B. 2251, 2015–2016 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); Illinois Public Act 100-0540, S.B. 1351, 100th Gen. Sess. § 10-5 (Ill. 2017); 
Student Loans, S.B. 6029, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2018). 
458. Under current law, the statutorily created duties of the CFPB’s Ombudsman are to (1) 
assist borrowers by attempting to help them resolve complaints about their private student loans, (2) 
analyze data collected from borrowers’ complaints and received from the Education Department’s 
ombudsman group, (3) make appropriate recommendations to the CFPB and others regarding the data 
analysis, and (4) submit annual reports regarding the activities of the CFPB’s Ombudsman. See 12  
U.S.C. § 5535(c)–(d). 
459. See, e.g., Student Loan Ombudsman Establishment and Servicing Regulation Amendment 
Act of 2016, 2016 D.C. Sess. L. Serv. 21–214, § 1–2; An Act to Establish Student Loan Bill of Rights, 
2019 Me. Legis. Serv. 2, § 14-104 (West) (requiring the ombudsman to “receive, review and attempt to 
resolve complaints” between borrowers and their servicers). 
460. See, e.g., S.B. 1351, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 10-5(b) (Ill. 2017). 
461. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 383, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 36.8 (Nev. 2019). 
462. See supra Sections III.B–C. 
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companies, assisting borrowers in getting refunds from relief companies, reporting 
relief companies to state enforcement authorities, and educating borrowers about 
how to avoid relief companies.463  
The state’s ombudsman should also be required to coordinate with the state’s 
attorney general to make it easy for borrowers to get connected to legitimate 
resources.464 Many state attorneys general already make it easy for borrowers to 
submit online complaints about companies suspected of committing fraud.465 
Moreover, several attorneys general have toll-free helplines and other resources that 
are specifically dedicated to assisting student loan borrowers.466 As a result, the 
state’s ombudsman should be required to inform borrowers about consumer 
complaint submission procedures available at the office of the state’s attorney 
general and about how they can obtain legitimate governmental help. 
Regarding the mandate to educate borrowers, a state ombudsman must be 
required to do more than issue warning statements about relief companies because 
such warnings are insufficient. For years, websites for the FTC, the CFPB, and the 
Education Department have warned borrowers about relief scammers.467 
Moreover, state attorneys general, including Lisa Madigan, former Illinois Attorney 
 
463. A provision in Maine’s Student Loan Bill of Rights Act is broad enough to permit the 
ombudsman to educate borrowers about how to avoid relief scams. See 2019 Me. Legis. Serv. 2,  
§ 14-104 (West) (requiring the ombudsman to “[a]ssist student loan borrowers to understand their 
rights and responsibilities under the terms of student education loans”). 
464. If funding of the state ombudsman’s position may be limited, or nonexistent, state 
lawmakers can require the state ombudsman to coordinate with the state’s attorney general to make it 
easy for borrowers to submit complaints regarding relief companies.  
465. For example, borrowers in the following states can submit complaints: Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Protecting Consumers: Filing a Consumer 
Complaint, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. KWAME RAOUL, https://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/
filecomplaint.html [https://perma.cc/SP9C-9WBM] ( last visited Sept. 29, 2019); File a consumer 
complaint, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/how-to/file-a-consumer-complaint [https://perma.cc/ 
WH7K-QAJ6] ( last visited Sept. 29, 2020); Filing a Consumer Complaint, LETITIA JAMES NY ATT’Y 
GEN., https://ag.ny.gov/consumer-frauds/Filing-a-Consumer-Complaint [https://perma.cc/BBV3-
TQ68] ( last visited Sept. 29, 2020); Submit a Complaint, JOSH SHAPIRO ATT’Y GEN., https://
www.attorneygeneral.gov/submit-a-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/NH9V-ML52] ( last visited  
Sept. 29, 2020); File a Complaint, WASH. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., https://www.atg.wa.gov/
fileacomplaint.aspx [https://perma.cc/J5HM-LK42] ( last visited Sept. 29, 2020).  
466. See, e.g., An Examination of State Efforts to Oversee the $1.5 Trillion Student Loan Servicing 
Martket: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra 
note 24 (statement of Joe Sanders, Student Loan Ombudsman and Supervising Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Consumer Fraud Bureau, Illinois Att’y Gen.’s Office) (stating that since 2015, the Illinois Attorney 
General has maintained a Student Loan Helpline, through which it has received in excess of 5,500 calls). 
467. See, e.g., Alvaro Puig, Avoid a Debt Relief Scam (Fotonovela), FED. TRADE COMM’N ( June 
20, 2016), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2016/06/avoid-debt-relief-scam-fotonovela 
[https://perma.cc/8BVD-BZUF] (warning posted by an FTC consumer education specialist); Rohit 
Chopra, Consumer Advisory: Student Loan Debt Relief Companies May Cost You Thousands of Dollars 
and Drive You Further into Debt, CFPB (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/blog/consumer-advisory-student-loan-debt-relief-companies-may-cost-you-thousands-of-dollars-
and-drive-you-further-into-debt/ [https://perma.cc/P2VD-KXQV]; Avoiding Student Aid Scams, 
Fed. Student Aid, https://studentaid.gov/resources/scams [https://perma.cc/ZZ95-NE78] ( last 
visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
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General, have been warning consumers about student loan relief scams since 
2014.468 Yet as recently as December 2019 and January 2020, the CFPB, the FTC, 
and state attorneys general filed lawsuits against several different companies for 
perpetrating phony student loan debt relief.469 Recall also that several victims used 
Google to search for reviews about relief companies that had contacted them and, 
after finding favorable reviews, erroneously concluded that the companies were 
legitimate.470 However, the Operation Game of Loans litigation demonstrates that 
these favorable reviews were almost certainly fake.471  
The state ombudsman should be required to create educational materials that 
explain how to spot the red flags of a student loan relief scam.472 Specifically, the 
ombudsman’s borrower education program could use litigation documents from 
the FTC’s Operation Game of Loans to teach borrowers how to recognize red flags 
such as a company (1) requesting payment up front, (2) guaranteeing a reduction in 
student loan payments, or (3) claiming borrowers are preapproved for loan 
forgiveness.473 If Ms. Olds had received this type of education, she would have been 
able to conclude that American Financial was not offering legitimate relief.474  
Borrowers also need to be educated about the role of search engines and social 
media platforms in furthering scams.475 Such education could have been helpful to 
consumers like Jackie Hampe, a resident of Iowa who searched online using the 
 
468. See, e.g., Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen., Madigan Files Lawsuits Over New Student Loan 
Debt Scam ( July 14, 2014), https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2014_07/20140714b.html 
[https://perma.cc/HQ5X-MPZV]; Complaint for Equitable Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 
supra note 179. 
469. See, e.g., Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Chou Team Realty, LLC,  
No. 8:20-cv-00043, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2020) (alleging that Docs Done Right violated federal  
anti-telemarketing laws); Stipulated Final Judgment and Order, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Chou 
Team Realty, LLC, No. 8-20-cv-00043-JVS-ADS (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2020) (noting that defendants, 
including Monster Loans, have settled, with defendants collectively owing $18 million in monetary relief 
and Chou Realty individually responsible for a $350,000 civil money penalty); supra notes 81–86 (alleging 
that in 2019 the defendants operating Premier Student Loan Center were still scamming borrowers 
despite a preliminary injunction having previously been entered against them).  
470. Even a person with access to more advanced research, such as LexisNexis, could have 
been misled by a favorable review, story, or press release about American Financial. In conducting 
research for this Article, I found press releases by American Financial when performing a search using 
Lexis (with following key terms: (american /2 financial) and (student /2 loan /10 repayment or plan 
or forgive or forgiveness) and (brandon /5 frere)). See, e.g., Am. Fin. Benefits Ctr., AFBC  
Reminder: Student Loan Repayment Is Solely on Borrower, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM),  
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/afbc-reminder-student-loan-repayment-is-solely-on-
borrower-300595612.html [https://perma.cc/W5T3-ATVY]. 
471. See supra notes 155–161 and accompanying text (describing relief company’s practice of 
paying for fake favorable reviews to appear on Facebook).  
472. A state ombudsman already has available resources to create a comprehensive course 
because the FTC and other agencies already have information about relief scams on their websites. See 
supra note 467 and accompanying text. 
473. For a list of red flags, see Fair, supra note 95.  
474. See supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text (describing how Ms. Olds erroneously 
concluded that a relief company was offering legitimate help). 
475. See supra notes 155–210 and accompanying text (providing examples of how relief 
companies use online search engines and social media platforms to deceive borrowers).  
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words “Great Lakes.”476 She was looking for a phone number for Great Lakes 
Higher Education Corp., her federally authorized student loan servicer.477 The 
number that popped up was not for Great Lakes but for a company called Student 
Debt Doctor LLC, which was later shut down for operating a student loan relief 
scam.478 Similarly, the now-defunct Student Aid Center had an Instagram account 
through which it uploaded photos of an aerial banner bragging about its student 
loan forgiveness program, which turned out to be fraudulent.479 The scandals 
involving Facebook and the Russian trolls demonstrate that consumers could be 
reading online about a completely bogus relief program.480 The ombudsman’s 
comprehensive education will do borrowers a huge service by showing them how 
to avoid relying on Google, Facebook, and other online platforms when searching 
for legitimate help. 
CONCLUSION 
“We told consumers that we would lower or eliminate their student loan 
debt . . . . [I]t never worked,” said a former supervisor at a now-defunct  
relief company.481 
Baiting consumers with false promises to alleviate the burden of $1.6 trillion 
in student loan debt, relief companies weaponize modern technologies. Moreover, 
relief companies pretend to be the legitimate entities that can help consumers enroll 
in income-driven repayment plans and loan forgiveness programs. Through 
Operation Game of Loans, federal and state authorities have obtained  
court-ordered injunctions shutting down several relief companies. However, many 
companies are still peddling bogus relief programs. 
Currently, borrowers largely have to fend for themselves in an environment 
where leaders of both the Education Department and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau have refused to exercise their supervisory and regulatory 
authority to hold accountable loan servicing companies—the legitimate businesses 
that are contractually obligated to assist student loan borrowers. Moreover, recently 
filed lawsuits accuse Secretary DeVos and the Education Department of unlawfully 
adopting a new regulation to prevent borrowers from discharging student loan debts 
 
476. See Richard Read & Teddy Nykiel, Education Agency Blasted Amid Student Loan Scam 
Crackdown, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2017, 7:36 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-education-
agency-blasted-amid-student-loan-scam-crackdown-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/H7LR-A4CB].  
477. Id.  
478. Id.  
479. See Plaintiffs’ Motion against SAC, supra note 144, at 3. 
480. See Mark Walsh, Facebook Plans to Create a Judicial-Like Body to Address Controversial 
Speech, ABA: ABA J. (May 1, 2019, 12:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
facebook-judicial-review-controversial-speech [https://perma.cc/8XEN-XC2A] (summarizing several 
scandals, including Facebook being has been a “conduit [of fake news] for Russian meddling in the 
2016 election”). 
481. See Deposition Testimony of Robert Greenberg at exhibit PX01, FTC Motion Against 
CAP, supra note 403 (stating that he trained telemarketers at the relief company to “close” the deal by 
convincing borrowers to pay upfront fees for bogus loan relief). 
First to Printer_Johnson _EH Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  12:58 PM 
170 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:105 
incurred to attend unscrupulous for-profit schools,482 and violating the CARES Act 
by garnishing borrowers’ paychecks and intercepting their tax refunds during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.483 Furthermore, President Trump’s 2021 budget proposal, 
titled “A Budget for America’s Future,” plans to cut $170 billion from education 
spending by eliminating subsidized federal student loans, reducing repayment 
options for borrowers, and eliminating the Public Service Loan Forgiveness.484 
President Trump is signaling that he does not value making college affordable and 
is not interested in incentivizing young people to become public servants in  
low-paying but fulfilling professions. As a result, the Trump administration 
continues to foster an environment where debt relief scams can flourish. 
Federal lawmakers have an opportunity to deter relief scams by passing 
bipartisan legislation that would, among other things, subject scammers to criminal 
 
482. See supra notes 257–258 and accompanying text (describing the Borrower Defense Rule 
implemented during President Obama’s administration and Secretary DeVos’s replacement of it with a 
new regulation that makes it virtually impossible for borrowers to obtain financial relief from 
burdensome debts accrued while attending unscrupulous for-profit schools); Complaint, Massachusetts 
v. DeVos, No. 20-cv-04717, 2020 WL 4004145 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 15, 2020) (alleging in lawsuit filed by 
attorneys general from more than twenty-one jurisdictions that Secretary DeVos’s new rule is unlawful 
and that “[t]he logical errors, unfounded assumptions, omissions and inconsistencies that undergird the 
[new rule] render the entire rule arbitrary and capricious”). 
483. See, e.g., supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the CARES Act’s provisions 
related to providing temporary relief to borrowers with federal student loans owned by the Education 
Department and litigation against it for violating the new law); Press Release, Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., 
U.S. Dept. of Education and Secretary DeVos Sued for Illegally Seizing Student Borrowers’ Paychecks 
During Coronavirus Emergency (May 1, 2020), https://www.nclc.org/media-center/u-s-dept-of-
education-and-secretary-devos-sued-for-illegally-seizing-student-borrowers-paychecks-during-
coronavirus-emergency.html [https://perma.cc/Z57S-H6LH] (summarizing class action lawsuit 
brought by student loan borrowers alleging that, due to Security DeVos’s inaction, the Education 
Department has continued to garnish their wages, in direct violation of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security (CARES) Act); Complaint, Barber v. DeVos, No. 1:20-cv-1137-CJN  
(D.D.C. April 30, 2020) (noting that despite the CARES Act requiring the Education Department to 
notify employers to stop wage garnishments by April 10, 2020, the class plaintiff continues to have 
twelve percent of her near minimum wage paychecks garnished because of Secretary DeVos’s failure 
to notify plaintiff’s employer); Complaint, Cole v. Mnuchin, No. 1:20-cv-1423 (D.D.C. May 29, 2020) 
(alleging in a class action lawsuit that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Education Secretary Betsy 
DeVos violating the CARES Act by intercepting nearly $19 million tax refunds owed to borrowers with 
federal student loan debt); see also Elura Nanos, Betsy DeVos Sued for Deciding DACA Recipients Don’t 
Deserve Coronavirus Funding, LAW & CRIME (May 12, 2020, 4:44 PM) https://lawandcrime.com/
opinion/betsy-devos-sued-for-deciding-daca-recipients-dont-deserve-coronavirus-funding/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HJ4N-AACX] (discussing how, during the 2020 pandemic, Secretary DeVos created 
additional eligibility requirements for individuals to receive federal aid under the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, excluding DACA recipients and other undocumented 
students and going against Congress’s original intent). 
484. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 110 (2020), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/budget_fy21.pdf [https://perma.cc/922L-
C6CU]; Laura Mecklern & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Education Plan Slashes Student Loan 
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liability for duping borrowers into disclosing their loan account information. That 
federal legislation would also require the Education Department to develop and 
implement technological solutions to prevent scammers from taking over 
borrowers’ online accounts. State legislatures also can afford borrowers meaningful 
protection by creating offices through which a student loan ombudsman is required 
to educate borrowers about how to avoid relief scams. Finally, state-created 
ombudsmen should have the authority and funding to advocate for student loan 
borrowers and educate them about how to get their federally authorized loan 
servicers to enroll them in legitimate repayment plans and forgiveness programs. 
  
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